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Summary
I n the fall of 1993, the Administration intro-duced a comprehensive proposal for healthcare reform. The Administration's proposal
attempted to balance the desire for increased access
to medical care with the need to control costs, both
overall and in the specific case of Pharmaceuticals.
This report concentrates on how proposed changes
in health care policy—primarily universal coverage
and improved Medicare benefits-are likely to affect
the size and composition of the pharmaceutical
market and the incentives of drug companies to
engage in research and development (R&D). The
provisions in the Administration's proposal for
health care reform that deal explicitly with pharma-
ceuticals focus mainly on outpatient prescription
drugs. In general, the insurance status of inpatient
and over-the-counter Pharmaceuticals would not be
changed directly, though the economic incentives
facing those who produce and consume them are
likely to change.
Although the study focuses on the Health Secu-
rity Act, many of that plan's features are also in-
cluded in other proposals for health care reform.
Wherever those other proposals contain provisions
similar to the ones examined here, the same analysis
would apply.
Industry R&D and Market
Structure
Pharmaceutical expenditures have been rising both
in real terms and as a share of national health ex-
penditures. The share of prescription drug spend-
ing, excluding most over-the-counter drugs, ac-
counted for 6.4 percent of total national health
expenditures in 1991, up from 4.4 percent in 1981.
As a share of gross domestic product (GDP), pre-
scription drug spending rose during most of this
period, reaching 0.8 percent of GDP in 1991. Out-
patient prescription drugs account for three-quarters
of all pharmaceutical sales. Other Pharmaceuticals
are administered in inpatient settings, such as hospi-
tals. In 1993, U.S. prescription sales exceeded $55
billion, according to industry figures.
Industry R&D
Research and development in the pharmaceutical
industry (both foreign and domestic) has increased
continuously for the last two decades, both in abso-
lute terms and as a percentage of sales. According
to industry figures, in 1993 domestic R&D funded
by the industry reached $10.3 billion, or 18 percent
of sales. The high level of R&D in this industry,
together with relatively low production costs, has
created a cost structure that encourages companies
to seek ever-larger markets for their products, even
if this requires substantial price discounts. The
reason is that once a product is developed and ap-
proved for sale, it has already incurred R&D costs.
Additional sales, even at deep discounts, serve to
spread the R&D costs. The fact that pharmaceutical
companies can offer some consumers price reduc-
tions that they do not offer to others also en-
courages discounting.
The high technical levels fostered by R&D, cou-
pled with a favorable cost structure, have resulted in
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a domestic industry that is very competitive interna-
tionally. U.S. firms developed almost half of the
important new drugs-those that are sold in all ma-
jor markets around the world-that were introduced
between 1970 and 1992. According to the Depart-
ment of Commerce, U.S. firms sold one-half (by
value) of the world's Pharmaceuticals that were
consumed in 1991.
The Changing U.S. Market
Seventy percent of prescriptions are for drugs that
are manufactured by more than one company. Even
the remaining 30 percent, however, often face com-
petition by substitutes.
On a scale ranging between a perfect monopoly
and perfect competition, the pharmaceutical industry
can probably best be described as imperfectly com-
petitive; firms have some power to raise prices and
generate excess profits. Observers suggest, how-
ever, that recent events in the pharmaceutical market
are undercutting this power somewhat and serving
to move the industry in the direction of more com-
petition.
The market is changing. On the supply side,
sales of generic drugs are increasing. On the de-
mand side, buyers exercise more market power to
reduce the profits of the pharmaceutical companies.
Demand-side changes include the spread of compa-
nies devoted to managing the pharmaceutical bene-
fits for third-party payers, such as health insurance
companies, and the expansion of the market share of
managed health care providers. Both of these
groups use a variety of techniques to reduce phar-
maceutical costs, including aggressive negotiations
with pharmaceutical companies, restrictive drug
utilization lists, and widespread use of generic
drugs. Although the use of these techniques is
growing, only a small fraction of buyers currently
employ them, and even then inconsistently. Still, as
a share of total prescription sales, the volume of
generic drugs has increased from 23 percent in 1980
to almost 40 percent. Furthermore, patents on many
of the top-selling drugs will expire in the next few
years, opening the door to even more competition
among manufacturers of generic drugs.
Provisions That Increase
Demand for Prescription
Drugs
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has ana-
lyzed two provisions of the Administration's pro-
posal that are likely to increase demand for pre-
scription drugs directly: a universal entitlement to a
comprehensive package of health benefits, including
reimbursement for prescription drugs (universal
coverage), and the addition of a prescription drug
benefit to Medicare, which is the primary source of
health insurance coverage for the population that is
65 years old and older.
CBO's estimate of the change in demand for
Pharmaceuticals omits several provisions of the
Administration's proposal, usually because these
provisions proved impossible to quantify, even
approximately. For example, CBO provides no
estimate of the way in which shifts to managed care
providers would affect the use of prescription drugs,
although anecdotal evidence suggests that managed
care providers use more prescription drugs than do
fee-for-service providers. In addition, incentives
facing providers would change under the Adminis-
tration's proposal and might affect the use of drugs.
The proposed provision of universal coverage,
including a drug benefit, would increase total pre-
scription drug expenditures by 3 percent to 5 per-
cent. Adding a drug benefit to Medicare would
increase total prescription drug expenditures by 1
percent. CBO estimates that these provisions of the
Administration's proposal would increase total ex-
penditures on all prescription drugs by 4 percent to
6 percent.
Effects of the Administration's
Proposal for Universal Coverage
on Drug Demand
The Administration's proposal would extend health
insurance coverage to all legal residents of the
United States. The under-65 population would be
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covered by one of three basic types of plans, each
of which would include coverage for hospitalization,
physician visits, and outpatient prescription drugs.
The drug benefit in the Administration's proposal
for the high-cost-sharing option would pay 80 per-
cent of the cost of prescription drugs after a $250
deductible had been met. If a person were to enroll
in the low-cost-sharing option, he or she would pay
$5 per prescription with no deductible. The combi-
nation plan would offer the low-cost-sharing bene-
fits when a patient used a plan's network of health
care providers. Otherwise, the high-cost-sharing
benefits would apply. All three plans would place
an annual limit of $1,500 per individual ($3,000 for
families) on all out-of-pocket medical expenses.
Universal coverage under the Administration's
proposal would have the greatest impact on demand
for prescription drugs by extending benefits to the
37 million people under age 65 who are currently
uninsured. Under the comprehensive benefits pro-
posed, coverage would also improve for another 8
percent of the under-65 population who are insured.
But most of the population under 65 already has
hospital, physician, and drug coverage through an
employer, similar to that included in the Adminis-
tration's proposal. CBO estimates that universal
coverage, including the proposed drug benefit,
would increase demand by the under-65 population
for all prescription drugs by 5 percent to 7 percent.
It is primarily the demand for outpatient prescription
drugs that would rise. The under-65 population
currently accounts for two-thirds of all prescription
drug sales. Thus, universal coverage would increase
the total demand of the entire population for all
prescription drugs by 3 percent to 5 percent.
Effects of the Administration's
Proposal for Expanded Medicare
Benefits on Drug Demand
Under Medicare, everyone 65 and over and eligible
for Social Security is automatically entitled to hos-
pitalization benefits. So are certain disabled people
under 65 and some people with severe renal disease.
All people who are 65 and over, as well as other
people who are eligible for Medicare's hospitaliza-
tion benefits, may participate in Medicare's Supple-
mentary Medical Insurance program, which covers
physician, outpatient hospital, and independent
laboratory services. Participants must pay a
monthly premium. Supplementary Medical Insur-
ance, to which the drug benefits would be added,
covers 95 percent of the 65-and-over population.
Under the Administration's proposal, Medicare
beneficiaries would for the first time have a pre-
scription drug benefit as part of their basic cover-
age. That benefit would be approximately commen-
surate with the high-cost-sharing option available
for the rest of the population under the Administra-
tion's proposal. The benefit would pay 80 percent
of the cost of prescription drugs after a $250 de-
ductible had been met. Once the recipient had paid
$1,000 in out-of-pocket prescription drug expenses,
Medicare would cover all pharmaceutical purchases
for the year. The Medicare Supplementary Medical
Insurance premium would be increased to pay for
one-quarter of the cost of the new drug benefits.
The new Medicare coverage would also encourage
substitution of generic drugs unless otherwise re-
quested by the physician.
By itself, adding the prescription benefit would
not be likely to increase pharmaceutical purchases
by the 65-and-over population dramatically. Just
over half of the 65-and-over population already has
supplemental coverage for prescription drugs, pri-
marily through retirement plans. In addition to the
basic benefits they get from Medicare, most 65-and-
over Medicare beneficiaries also have supplemental
coverage for physician services. Many analysts
believe that access to physicians is a major factor
determining prescription drug expenditures, perhaps
more important than drug coverage itself. Conse-
quently, CBO estimates that outpatient drug expen-
ditures for the entire 65-and-over population would
rise by only 4 percent if prescription drug coverage
were extended to it as a basic benefit. Currently,
this population accounts for one-third of all pre-
scription drug purchases. The estimated increase in
expenditures for outpatient drugs by Medicare bene-
ficiaries corresponds to a 1 percent rise in the total
prescription drug expenditures of the entire popula-
tion.
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Provisions That Control Costs
The Administration's proposal attempts to control
health costs, both directly and indirectly. Most
important, it would control the rate of increase in
the premiums that health plans could charge for the
standard benefit package and would result in major
changes in the structure of the health care market-
place. For prescription drugs, rebates and close
inspection of introductory prices of new drugs may
be the most important direct mechanisms. In addi-
tion, indirect effects on the medical care delivery
system, such as through increased enrollment in
health maintenance organizations that may substitute
drugs for surgical or other medical procedures,
could be substantial, but they cannot be measured
without appreciable error and are not analyzed
quantitatively in this study.
Medicare Rebates
In order to reduce the impact of the expanded Medi-
care benefit on the taxpayer, the Administration's
proposal includes a rebate of at least 17 percent that
pharmaceutical manufacturers would have to agree
to pay to the government on all brand-name (non-
generic) prescription drugs purchased on an outpa-
tient basis by Medicare beneficiaries. (The rebate
on drugs purchased by Medicaid enrollees would
end.) The Medicare rebate would be based on the
"average manufacturer retail price," which is defined
as the price paid to pharmaceutical manufacturers
for drugs that are sold through pharmacies and other
retailers.
The rebate would increase if the difference
between the average manufacturer retail price and
the average price paid by institutional purchasers,
such as hospitals, exceeded 17 percent. In that case,
the rebate would equal the average discount given
to institutional purchasers. If the amount of the
drugs consumed by Medicare beneficiaries was
sufficiently large in relation to the total demand for
the drug, the manufacturer would be likely to keep
the average discount rate afforded institutional pur-
chasers at or below 17 percent.
This rebate would assure that the government
paid no more. on average for a drug purchased
through Medicare than institutional purchasers do,
and would sometimes pay less. The rebate would
probably have a much greater effect on drug com-
pany profits than the price discount given to a typi-
cal institution. People who are 65 years old or
older account for one-third of prescription drug
sales, but each institution represents only a small
fraction of the total market.
The rebate would also increase if the average
manufacturer retail price of a drug rose faster than
the rate of inflation as measured by the consumer
price index. In addition, manufacturers would not
be able to exclude a portion of their drugs that are
already on the market from the rebate agreement.
Either all of the manufacturer's existing drugs or
none would be covered by Medicare.
Based on a sample of 100 patented drugs on
which the Medicaid program currently spends the
most money, CBO found that the median best dis-
count given to institutional purchasers was 18 per-
cent off the average manufacturer price (approxi-
mately the price paid by wholesalers and the Medic-
aid rebate equivalent of the "average manufacturer
retail price"). Since the average discount given to
institutional purchasers would be lower than the best
discount given to any institutional purchaser, the
average amount that brand-name drugs are dis-
counted for institutional purchasers may often be
below 17 percent.
Discounts are currently smaller than they might
be in the absence of Medicaid rebates. The incen-
tive to give institutional buyers discounts in excess
of 17 percent on drugs purchased by people 65 and
over would diminish, but perhaps no more so than it
has already under the Medicaid rebate agreement.
Medicare Rebates on New Drugs
For any prescription drug that was first marketed
after June 1993, Medicare could negotiate a special
rebate if the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS) believed the drug was priced exces-
sively or if the drug was marketed abroad at a lower
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price. The drug company and the Secretary would
have six months from the date of the approval by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to negoti-
ate a rebate agreement. If HHS and the company
failed to negotiate such an agreement, the Secretary
could refuse to reimburse purchases of the drug
under the Medicare drug benefit. Without this
provision, drug companies would be more likely to
try offsetting the rebate by charging higher launch
prices.
A special rebate could be negotiated if the price
in one or more of almost two dozen foreign—mostly
European—countries was significantly below the
introductory price in the United States. Since it is
unlikely that U.S. introductory prices of any given
drug would be lower than the prices in all of these
countries, all new drugs could be subject to special
rebate negotiations.
Although much of the policy debate has been
focused on breakthrough drugs, imitative ("me too")
drugs also play a major role in the pharmaceutical
market. By providing a therapeutic alternative,
these drugs can make a market more competitive
well before the patent on the original drug expires,
thus limiting the ability of a breakthrough drug's
manufacturer to sustain excessive prices. Under the
Administration's proposal, only generic drugs would
be exempt from the rebate on new drugs. If the
Medicare rebate on new drugs is set too high, it
could discourage competition and early entry.
Given the uncertainty inherent in deciding on a
reasonable price, the rebate provision increases the
risk of launching new drugs. Similarly, if the rebate
is extended to generic drugs, it might also discour-
age entry. These effects would not be felt immedi-
ately because drug companies would probably finish
those projects that are nearing completion.
The actions of Medicare, sometimes in conjunc-
tion with the Advisory Council on Breakthrough
Drugs, could give the federal government a major
influence over the prices of many pharmaceuticals.
Under the Administration's proposal, the Secretary
of HHS would negotiate the initial rebate, based on
the "reasonableness" of the launch price. After the
launch period, the Medicare rebate would increase if
a pharmaceutical company raised its prices above
the rate of inflation. Consequently, the federal
government would be sending strong signals to
manufacturers on launch price and subsequent price
increases. The combination of these policies would
not have as much force as formal price controls, but
would go against a longstanding trend of eliminat-
ing price and quantity controls and keeping health
and quality regulations.
Advisory Council on
Breakthrough Drugs
Under the Administration's proposal, when any new
drug that represents a significant therapeutic ad-
vance is approved by the FDA, the launch price
would be subject to review by a 13-member Advi-
sory Council on Breakthrough Drugs. This council,
appointed by the Secretary of HHS, would be re-
sponsible for determining whether a launch price
was "reasonable" or not, basing its judgment on
related and foreign drug prices; manufacturer's
costs, including R&D; various market forecasts; the
cost effectiveness of the drug; and its potential
contribution to the quality of life. The Secretary of
HHS would publish the council's determination,
together with minority opinions, in the Federal
Register. Presumably, the Advisory Council's
judgment would be a significant factor in the
Medicare rebate negotiations and might affect pri-
vate negotiations as well. Because the council
would deal with all breakthrough drugs, its respon-
sibilities would extend beyond Medicare.
Depending on how the proposed legislation is
interpreted, however, the Advisory Council could
play a role in just a very small number of drug
introductions. Between 1975 and 1991, the FDA
approved an average of 22 new drugs (containing
new active ingredients, or "new molecular entities"
in FDA parlance) per year. The breakthrough cate-
gory, promising major new therapeutic potential,
accounted for one-seventh of all new molecular
entities, or about three drugs each year. Including
drugs with only modest therapeutic improvement
would increase this number to 11 per year.
Although only a few drugs can be classified as
breakthroughs, many companies undertake their
R&D with the intent of developing just such phar-
maceuticals. Thus, even though the number of
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drugs directly involved might be small, the inhibit-
ing effect on pharmaceutical companies could be
much greater.
Effects on the Returns from
Drug Development
Underlying the Administration's proposal are two
conflicting effects: the extension of drug benefits to
the entire population could increase the total de-
mand for prescription drugs by 4 percent to 6 per-
cent, boosting profits of pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers; but rebates on drugs sold to Medicare patients
and other cost controls could limit profits (or re-
turns). The net effect on returns from drug devel-
opment would be small and positive when averaged
among all drugs, but would differ among drugs and
could be negative for some.
Estimated profits from drug development, aver-
aged among all drugs and outpatient markets, would
Summary Table 1.
The Effect of the Administration's Proposal on the Present Value of
Profits Generated Over the Lifetime of the Average Drug
Change in Average Profits from
Developing a Drug (In percent)8
Administration's
Proposal
Universal
Coverage
Description
The proposal contains
a universal entitle-
ment to a standard
benefit package that
includes prescription
drug coverage. Pri-
marily affects the
under-65 population.
Effect on the
Presciption Drug
Market
Expenditures by
the under-65
population on all
Pharmaceuticals
would rise by 6
percent.
Drugs
Purchased
Only by
People
Under 65
8
Drugs
Purchased
Only by
People
65 and Over
0
Drugs Purchased
Two-Thirds by
People Under 65,
One-Third by
People 65 and Over
(Market average)b
6
Medicaid
Becomes Part
of the Alliance
System
Drug Benefit
Added to
Medicare
Government would
fully subsidize
participation of
most Medicaid
recipients in the
alliance system.
Medicare would
cover outpatient
drugs. A rebate
of at least 17 per-
cent would be im-
posed on outpatient
drugs purchased
through Medicare.
Medicaid rebates
would be eliminated.
Average unit revenues
on outpatient sales
would rise by 2
percent.
Expenditures by the
65-and-over population
on outpatient pharma-
ceuticals would rise
by 4.5 percent. Unit
revenues would decline
by 17 percent.
Total 11
-17
•14
-6
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
a. Change in the discounted value of the stream of profits generated by the worldwide sales of the average drug over its lifetime.
b. On average, people 65 and over account for 34 percent of prescription drug expenditures.
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rise modestly—by less than 3 percent—under the
Administration's proposal. Consequently, the level
of industry R&D might not change appreciably,
given the small changes in total returns from drug
development. (See Summary Table 1.)
Behind this average, however, market segments
would vary significantly. Profits would fall by an
average of 14 percent on those drugs that are sold
exclusively to the 65-and-over population and would
rise by 11 percent on those drugs sold exclusively
to the under-65 population. Although few drugs are
marketed exclusively to either population, CBO's
analysis found that under the Administration's pro-
posal, once half of the market for a drug was made
up of sales to the 65-and-over population, returns
would decline slightly.
A decline in the profits from developing phar-
maceuticals primarily for the 65-and-over market
would reduce the incentives to produce such drugs.
The difference in returns on the basis of age groups
might cause some R&D to be shifted away from
drugs targeted at those 65 and over toward drugs
aimed primarily at those under 65.
These estimates should not be viewed as CBO's
final analysis of the overall effects of the Adminis-
tration's proposal. Rather, they are best viewed as
illustrative estimates of the portion of the proposal
that CBO was able to quantify. Although the fac-
tors omitted could serve to increase or decrease
returns, CBO's sensitivity analysis showed that large
variations in the assumptions about induced demand
do not change the overall result-namely, that the
proposal would affect average profits from drug
development only slightly.
CBO's calculations assume that the manufactur-
ers entirely absorb the cost of the 17 percent Medi-
care rebate. Such burdens, however, are usually
shared between producers and consumers according
to their relative sensitivity to changes in price. But
because the Administration proposes to monitor
launch prices and price increases, pharmaceutical
companies might find it difficult to pass these re-
bates on to other consumers. Consequently, the
drug companies would probably absorb a very large
share of the rebate.
However, the more Medicare administrators are
able to make pharmaceutical producers absorb the
cost of the rebate, the less incentive these producers
will have to invest in developing new drugs for the
65-and-over market. By contrast, the less Medicare
administrators are able to make the pharmaceutical
companies absorb the rebate, the more other drug
consumers will pay for the Medicare benefits.
CBO's estimates assume that the federal govern-
ment could enforce price restraints. But that is an
open question. Many times in the past the federal
government has tried to restrain price growth, usu-
ally with mixed results at best. The modern market
is too complicated for a limited bureaucracy to track
and control successfully. Prices in the drug market
are especially complicated; drug prices vary in
many dimensions (dosage, form, and packaging, to
name only three), any one of which could be used
to mask a price increase. Given the hundreds of
drugs and manufacturers and the thousands of dos-
age and packaging forms, the federal agencies in
charge of monitoring drug prices would have to rely
on the basic compliance of the drug companies, as
they do now for the Medicaid rebate. Such reliance
often leads to incomplete compliance.

Chapter One
Introduction
I n many ways, the debate over the interactionbetween health care reform and the pharma-ceutical industry represents a more general
tension generated by changes in the health care
system and the development of new medical tech-
nologies. On the one hand, U.S. medicine is the
most technologically advanced in the world. The
public appreciates this and generally endorses the
continued development and provision of high-tech-
nology health care. On the other hand, many peo-
ple feel that health care costs too much and that the
rapid pace of technological development is a major
contributing factor.
As proposals to restructure the health care sys-
tem have proliferated, critics have expressed con-
cern about the effects the proposed changes would
have on research and development (R&D) and fu-
ture access to new treatments, including pharmaceu-
ticals and other medical technologies. The quandary
facing health care reform efforts can be summed up
as a public desire to save the goose that laid the
golden eggs, but not to pay too much for the goose.
The desire for profits (or returns) is one of the
basic reasons that investors fund the R&D needed to
produce new pharmaceuticals and other medical
technology. The higher the anticipated returns from
technology development, the greater the incentive to
invest in the necessary R&D. If changes in the
health care system increase the profits from devel-
oping new medical technology, firms are likely to
increase their investment in it. Conversely, de-
creases in the returns from developing new medical
technology are likely to lower the level of R&D in
this field. Thus, reducing costs must be balanced
against affording sufficient incentive for drug com-
panies and other providers of medical technology to
continue investing in medical progress.
The Administration's proposal, the Health Secu-
rity Act, could change the returns from pharmaceu-
tical R&D.1 Although this study analyzes the effect
of the Administration's proposal on these returns,
many of its conclusions apply to other plans that
incorporate the same or similar features. Since
other health care proposals are trying to accomplish
similar goals, they face many of the same tensions
and are likely to use many of the same mechanisms.
Most reform proposals contain three elements
that would affect patterns of pharmaceutical use and
spending:
o Expanding coverage in the form of new benefits
and to new people,
o Shifting people into managed care, and
o Controlling costs.
What economists know about these elements is
very spotty. Surveys are available to help quantify
the effect of expanded coverage. Little information
exists, however, to help predict the effects of a
greater shift toward managed care plans or cost
control mechanisms on pharmaceutical spending.
References to the Administration's proposal are to the Health
Security Act, H.R. 3600 and S. 1757,103rd Congress, 1st Session,
1993. For a more comprehensive analysis of that proposal, see
Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Administration's
Health Proposal (February 1994).
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For example, the comparison of the use of pharma-
ceuticals in fee-for-service health plans with their
use in health maintenance organizations is based on
one limited study. The dual nature of pharmaceu-
tical consumption~the fact that drugs complement
medical treatments as well as substitute for them—
also complicates the analysis. Thus, cutting down
health costs could lower pharmaceutical demand in
one way, but increase it in another.
The Administration's proposal also contains
provisions that may affect pharmaceutical demand
and are likely to interact with each other as well as
with the three elements above. A partial list in-
cludes:
o Outpatient prescription drug coverage for Medi-
care beneficiaries;
o Rebates on outpatient prescription drugs sold to
Medicare beneficiaries;
o Special Medicare rebates on new drugs and an
Advisory Council on Breakthrough Drugs to
examine launch prices;
o An end to rebates on outpatient prescription
drugs sold to Medicaid beneficiaries;
o Coverage of some services that are not well
covered now by private health plans and have
significant drug treatment components (exam-
ples include mental health and family planning
services);
o Coverage of investigational treatments (such as
some experimental drugs for human immunode-
ficiency virus—HIV—infection);
o Increased out-of-pocket costs for prescription
drugs for many current Medicaid beneficiaries;
and
o Constraints on the rate of growth of premiums
for the standard benefit package.
The combined effect of these provisions on
pharmaceutical demand and supply and on the fu-
ture profitability of pharmaceutical R&D is highly
uncertain. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
cannot realistically provide a quantitative estimate
of all the effects of the Administration's proposal on
the pharmaceutical market. CBO's analysis exam-
ined the first four items on the list, in addition to
expanded coverage. In cases where estimates of the
quantitative effects could be made, CBO did so. In
other instances, the range of uncertainty was too
great and CBO made no estimate. Even when
quantitative information is available, it must be
applied with caution. In sum, the assessments dis-
cussed in this study are best considered illustrative
and partial estimates of the effects of the Adminis-
tration's proposal for health care reform on the
profits from drug development.
Chapter Two
Industry and Market Background
T he U.S. prescription drug market has grownrapidly in recent years (see Figure 1). Theindustry estimates that domestic prescription
drug sales, both institutional and outpatient, have
almost doubled since 1988, reaching an estimated
$58 billion in 1993.1 Since 1980, U.S. spending for
prescription drugs has grown at an average annual
rate of 13 percent. (These estimates are not ad-
justed for inflation. Many economists are concerned
about the accuracy of the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics' measures of price changes for Pharmaceuticals
(see Box 1). Instead of using them, this study pres-
ents pharmaceutical spending in relation to the
economy and the rest of the health care sector.)
Although spending on prescription drugs has
grown rapidly, it accounts for only a relatively
small portion of national health expenditures (see
Figure 2). Since 1972, prescription drug shipments
have accounted for between 4.5 percent and 6.5 per-
cent of total national health expenditures. Indeed,
their share of national health expenditures has risen
by almost half since 1981. These figures represent
manufacturers' sales and do not reflect the final re-
tail cost to consumers. The share of retail sales
would be higher, but this estimate reflects the share
of health expenditures that go to drug manufactur-
ers.
This estimate excludes many over-the-counter drugs. Pharmaceu-
tical Manufacturers Association, Trends in U.S. Pharmaceutical
Sales and R&D (Washington, D.C.: PMA, October 1993), p. 8.
Data for 1993 were revised by PMA in February 1994 and ad-
justed to reflect missing data. The Congressional Budget Office
obtained a similar estimate by adjusting data on industry ship-
ments for over-the-counter drugs and net exports from the Census
of Manufacturers.
Prescription drug spending has doubled its share
of the gross domestic product (GDP) since 1972
(see Figure 3). In 1972, prescription drug ship-
ments accounted for 0.4 percent of GDP. By 1993,
this share had risen to 0.8 percent of GDP.
This estimate differs from other analyses in that
it deals exclusively with prescription drugs. The
national health accounts gather into one category
Figure 1.
U.S. Prescription Drug Sales
Billions of Dollars
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Congressional Budget Office based on Pharmaceuti-
cal Manufacturers Association, Trends in U.S. Phar-
maceutical Sales and R&D (Washington, D.C.:
PMA, October 1993), p. 8.
NOTE: Includes institutional and outpatient prescriptions. Esti-
mate for 1993 was revised by PMA in 1994 and ad-
justed by the Congressional Budget Office to reflect
missing data.
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Boxl.
Measurement Issues in Pharmaceutical Price Increases
By conventional measures, the pharmaceutical indus-
try has consistently high inflation rates. But these
conventional measures are not well suited to indus-
tries, such as the pharmaceutical business, that fre-
quently introduce new products.1 The measures may
overstate the rate of increase in pharmaceutical
prices. In essence, conventional inflation gauges fail
to reckon with major forms of competition in the
pharmaceutical industry and therefore may not be
useful indicators of true inflation in the industry.
Measured by the producer price index (PPI),
increases in pharmaceutical prices have been dra-
matic. The PPI for pharmaceuticals doubled be-
tween 1982 and 1993, while the PPI for all finished
goods rose by only one-quarter. In other words, the
average annual increase in pharmaceutical prices (6.5
percent) was more than triple that for all finished
goods (2 percent).
Several economists have criticized the sample
used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to
measure pharmaceutical price increases in the PPI,
saying:
The number of drugs on the Department of Health and
Human Services list of existing drugs increased by 50 per-
cent between 1982 and 1987. See David Cleeton, Valy
Goepfrich, and Burton Weisbrod, "What Does the Consumer
Price Index for Prescription Drugs Really Measure?" Health
Care Financing Review (Spring 1992), p. 45.
o The sample is too narrow,
o It is biased toward older drugs,
o It improperly incorporates generic drugs, and
o The measure excludes changes in quality.2
These critics argue that the relatively small
sample of drugs used by the BLS does not represent
the movements of the larger universe of drugs. In
one instance, the economists recalculated the degree
of pharmaceutical inflation using a larger sample
than that of the BLS and weighted the prices in a
way that more appropriately reflected the increasing
sales of new drugs. These two changes decreased
the measured inflation for the 1988-1991 period
from 8.4 percent as measured by the BLS to 6 per-
cent with the corrected methodology and a larger
sample.3 (The PPI for all finished goods increased
at an annual rate of 4.1 percent during this period.)
Although the studies analyzed the PPI in detail, similar com-
ments apply to the consumer price index (CPI) with some
modifications.
Ernst Berndt and Paul Greenberg, "Price Growth of Prescrip-
tion Pharmaceutical Preparations: An Update and Explana-
tion" (paper presented at the American Enterprise Institute
Conference on Competitive Strategies in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, Washington, D.C., October 27-28, 1993).
(drugs and medical nondurables) both prescription
drugs sold through retail outlets and other nondura-
ble medical supplies, most notably over-the-counter
drugs. Most estimates of prescription drug spending
as a proportion of national health expenditures do
not separate these out. Conversely, the national
health accounts leave out of this category drugs that
are consumed in hospitals, nursing homes, and doc-
tors' offices.
After the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approves a prescription drug, the drug's manufac-
turer often applies to have the product changed to
over-the-counter status to take advantage of con-
sumer brand loyalty, especially when the patent is
nearing expiration.2 How the Administration's pro-
posal would alter the incentives to change a drug's
status is beyond the scope of this study, which fo-
cuses on prescription drugs (see Figure 4 for a com-
parison of the U.S. over-the-counter and consumer
outpatient prescription drug markets).
Although federal statistical sources tally pre-
scription drugs according to where they were pur-
chased, these categories do not necessarily corre-
spond to the reimbursement categories used by
Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurance compa-
"Self-Medication Boom," Med Ad News (February 1994), p. 44.
See also "Switches Don't Come Easy," Med Ad News (January
1994), p. 21.
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The BLS agreed with the first two criticisms and
began to revise its pharmaceutical sampling method-
ology. The economists also argued that BLS meth-
odology did not properly include generic drugs.
When the BLS includes generic drugs, it usually
classifies them as "new" drugs. Under most circum-
stances, the BLS does not link a name brand to its
generic replacement. Only when the brand-name
manufacturer of a particular drug also produces a
generic version of that drug is the connection some-
times made.
This lack of connection between brand-name and
generic versions of the same drug means that the
BLS inflation measure usually misses the price de-
cline caused by movement to a cheaper generic drug.
For example, if a generic version costs 20 percent of
what the brand-name version costs, shifting 40 per-
cent of quantities purchased to the generic form
would bring the average cost down by 32 percent.4
If each drug is classified as different, however, the
BLS will never measure a price drop. The BLS
may catch future changes in the price of the generic
drug, but a one-time shift to cheap sources would be
missed. In the market for one drug, cephalexin, the
conventional inflation measure showed a price rise
of 14 percent during the April 1987-September
1990 period, while one that included generic ver-
sions showed a drop of 48 percent.5
The BLS price measures also have no way of
incorporating the added benefit to consumers of bet-
ter drugs; the prices of new drugs are not adjusted to
reflect additional therapeutic value. Recently, one
economist tried to make quality adjustments in one
product class (ulcer medicine) to see how much
prices had increased once the improvements were
factored in. She found that nominal price measures
had risen by 11 percent a year for the 1977-1989
period, but her quality-adjusted measure rose by only
6 percent a year for the same period.
Thus, two central policy goals for the pharma-
ceutical industry—controlling prices through new and
generic drugs and encouraging the development of
better drugs-are systematically mismeasured by both
the consumer price index and the PPL
4. Generic drug sales account for almost 40 percent of all drug
sales.
5. Zvi Griliches and Iain Cockburn, Generics and New Goods
in Pharmaceutical Price Indexes (Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard Institute of Economic Research, Harvard University,
December 1993).
6. Valerie Suslov, "Are There Better Ways to Spell Relief? A
Hedonic Pricing Analysis of Ulcer Drugs" (paper presented
at the American Enterprise Institute Conference on Com-
petitive Strategies in the Pharmaceutical Industry, Washing-
ton, D.C., October 27-28, 1993).
nies.3 Most important, drugs purchased in nursing
homes are often classified as outpatient drugs for
the purposes of private insurance and Medicaid re-
imbursement. Some drug purchases in certain
skilled nursing facilities, however, are classified as
inpatient for the purposes of reimbursement by
Medicare, just as they would be in a hospital.
The Congressional Budget Office assumes that
if outpatient prescription drug benefits are extended
Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs,
Risks and Rewards (February 1993), pp. 238-240.
to Medicare enrollees, most nursing home drug ex-
penditures not now covered by Medicare would be
included. In 1991, nursing homes accounted for 3
percent of total U.S. pharmaceutical sales. Con-
versely, some drugs purchased in hospitals are for
outpatient use. In 1991, hospitals accounted for 23
percent of total U.S. pharmaceutical sales. CBO
assumes that these two sources of error in estimat-
ing the inpatient portion of the prescription drug
market will largely offset each other and that the
inpatient market is 23 percent of the total prescrip-
tion drug market. CBO assumes the remainder is
the outpatient market.
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Structure of the U.S.
Pharmaceutical Industry
The U.S. pharmaceutical industry is internationally
competitive and research-intensive. It produces
medicines for both human and veterinary use.
Within the human-use category, the industry in-
cludes companies that produce brand-name and
sometimes generic drugs; those that manufacture
brand-name drugs and products often related to
other aspects of medical care; and makers of generic
drugs, diagnostic substances, and bulk chemicals.
The industry is one of the most research-
oriented in the United States. In 1991, it spent
almost three times as much on research and devel-
opment (as a percentage of sales) as the average for
all U.S. manufacturers.4
Figure 2.
Prescription Drug Spending as a Percentage of
National Health Expenditures
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Congressional Budget Office based on Pharmaceuti-
cal Manufacturers Association, Trends in U.S. Phar-
maceutical Sales and R&D (Washington, D.C.:
PMA, October 1993), p. 8, and data from the Health
Care Financing Administration.
Figure 3.
Prescription Drug Spending as a Percentage of
Gross Domestic Product
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Congressional Budget Office based on data from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis and Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association, Trends in U.S. Pharma-
ceutical Sales and R&D (Washington, D.C.: PMA,
October 1993), p. 8.
Competition and Barriers to
Entry in the Drug Industry
Manufacturers of the drugs that are most commonly
prescribed do not enjoy a monopoly. Instead, they
have competitors. In 1989, some 70 percent of pre-
scriptions were written for multisource drugs, both
brand-name and generic.5 For the most part, these
are drugs for which the patent has expired and that
are now made by both generic and brand-name
companies. Alternatively, the drug might still be
under patent, but manufactured or marketed under
license by more than one company. Only 30 per-
cent of prescriptions were for single-source drugs.
4. National Science Foundation, Selected Data on Research and
Development in Industry: 1991 (1993), Table SD-9. Industry
sources presented below differ.
5. Richard Caves, Michael Whinston, and Mark Hurwitz, "Patent
Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical
Industry," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeco-
nomics, 1991 (1991), p. 6.
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Figure 4.
U.S. Consumer Spending on Pharmaceuticals
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Congressional Budget Office based on data from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Health Gate
Financing Administration.
Just because a drug is made by only one company
does not mean that it has no competitors-often sev-
eral different drugs will be available to treat the
same medical condition.6
Although much of the policy debate has been
focused on breakthrough drugs, the imitative drugs
also play a major role in the pharmaceutical market.
Imitative or "me-too" drugs use the same biological
mechanism as breakthrough drugs and can therefore
serve as alternative treatments. By providing thera-
peutic alternatives, these drugs can introduce com-
petition into a market well before patents expire,
thus limiting the ability of the breakthrough-drug
manufacturers to sustain high prices. Me-too drugs
are often competing single-source drugs.
When Prozac was introduced into the antide-
pressant market in 1988, for example, it offered a
new treatment with fewer side effects than many of
6. A drug is considered multisource if bioequivalent versions are
available from more than one company. Other sources can be
brand-name or generic. If a drug is single source, it may have
close therapeutic substitutes, but not bioequivalent competitors.
Imitators (or "me-too" drugs) use different molecules to accom-
plish the same treatment as a single-source drugs. A generic drug
is certified by the FDA as being bioequivalent to the original drug
that has lost its patent.
the older antidepressants.7 The result was that Pro-
zac became one of the five most widely prescribed
drugs in the United States, enjoying worldwide sales
of $1 billion in 1992.8 Such a market was a tempt-
ing target for other companies. Within five years,
three lower-priced drugs, all using some variant of
the same treatment, were on the market in the
United States. Four other drugs are being sold in
Europe and await FDA approval for U.S. sale. Be-
cause there are several close rivals, manufacturers of
antidepressant drugs are being forced to offer dis-
counts, even though their patents last until after the
year 2000, when generic versions will be permitted
to enter the market.
One explanation for the rapid entry of rival
drugs into the market is that all were exploiting a
basic biomedical discovery and that the competing
companies had products already in the approval pro-
cess when Prozac was sanctioned for sale. In many
instances, the first company to exploit a new biolog-
ical discovery is merely the first among several to
complete a race to market. In some cases, however,
it is years before substitutes for truly innovative
drugs are introduced, although this is probably cor-
related with the size of the market they serve.9
The Prozac experience is not unique. According
to one recent study sponsored by the industry, in
therapeutic areas where treatments already existed,
new drugs introduced during 1991 and 1992 were
launched with prices that averaged 14 percent below
that of the market leader. New products in the most
active therapeutic categories averaged 36 percent
less.10 Another recent study of 148 drugs intro-
duced into the U.S. market between 1978 and 1987
indicated that more than half of those substances
that provided the same benefits as existing drugs but
offered no increase in therapeutic potential were
7. Milt Freudenheim, "The Drug Makers are Listening to Prozac,"
New York Times, Business Section, January 9, 1994, p. 7.
8. "100 Powerhouse Drugs," Med Ad News Supplement (May 1993),
pp. S3, S7, and S14.
9. Z. John Lu and William S. Comanor, "Strategic Pricing of New
Pharmaceuticals" (paper presented to the American Economics
Association, Boston, Mass., January 1994).
10. Boston Consulting Group, The Changing Environment for U.S.
Pharmaceuticals (New York: Boston Consulting Group, April
1993), pp. 8-9.
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introduced at prices below the market leaders.11 Af-
ter drugs were launched at low prices, however,
price increases for many of them were higher than
average. (Drugs that provided new therapeutic ca-
pabilities were introduced at a premium.) But in
general the authors found, "both the introductory
price and subsequent price increases are lower
when there are more substitutes in the market."12
[Authors' emphasis.]
In some instances, when there are only one or
two imitators, competitive pressures may not be
substantial. Often several drugs will be appropriate
to treat a given condition, but will be imperfect sub-
stitutes. Each drug may have its particular strengths
and weaknesses, and often side effects. Thus, a
doctor may treat the same malady differently in dif-
ferent patients. Even when firms compete, they
may primarily use nonprice factors to do so. A
firm may, for example, increase its promotional ef-
forts as a way of increasing market share. Price
competition is more likely to occur after several
rival manufacturers enter the scene. The fact that
some drugs may not have identical substitutes gives
the pharmaceutical companies some market power.
Although it is relatively easy to begin R&D in
the pharmaceutical industry, it is difficult to initiate
marketing. Some barriers are regulatory, such as
the seven- to eight-year process of getting a drug
approved by the FDA.13 Others are legal, such as
the monopoly provided by the patents on new medi-
cines. Other barriers are economic, such as the
large research infrastructure necessary to produce
new and sophisticated chemicals that can compete
in the world marketplace.
There are many small firms in the industry, but
large firms play a disproportionate role in sales and
R&D. During the 1980s, the largest 20 companies
accounted for almost two-thirds of the pharmaceuti-
cal industry's total shipments.14 But when only pre-
scription drugs are counted, the top 20 firms ac-
count for more than 80 percent of the industry's
sales.15
In recent years, biotechnology firms have en-
tered the industry in large numbers, but they have
yet to produce more than a handful of commercially
successful products. If new technology reduces the
cost of developing drugs, a substantial increase
should take place in the number and role of these
companies and their effect on prices and quantities
of drugs sold in the U.S. market. This change
would reduce some nonregulatory barriers to entry
into the industry.
Pharmaceutical Company Profits
High profits are commonly cited as proof of the
lack of competition in the pharmaceutical industry.
Although the industry does have high profit rates by
conventional measures (even accounting for higher
risk), such as the return on assets or return on
equity, these gauges are not well suited to such in-
dustries as the pharmaceutical business, which in-
vests heavily in intangible capital, such as marketing
and R&D.16 These measures of profitability may
introduce a bias that results in an understatement of
a firm's capital assets, which in turn produces an
overstatement of its profit rate. In essence, conven-
tional accounting measures of profit systematically
11. Lu and Comanor, "Strategic Pricing of New Pharmaceuticals."
12. Ibid., p. 26.
13. Joseph DiMasi and others, "Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceu-
tical Industry," Journal of Health Economics (1991), p. 123. See
also Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D, p.
151.
14. International Trade Commission, Global Competitiveness of U.S.
Advanced-Technology Manufacturing Industries: Pharmaceuticals
(September 1991), p. 4-2. Shipments cover the received net sell-
ing values at the manufacturing plant of all product shipped.
15. Ernst Berndt and Paul Greenberg, "Price Growth of Prescription
Pharmaceutical Preparations: An Update and Explanation" (paper
presented at the American Enterprise Institute Conference on
Competitive Strategies in the Pharmaceutical Industry, Washing-
ton, D.C., October 27-28, 1993).
16. Most of the marketing expenses of the pharmaceutical industry are
not in advertising, but in promotional visits to doctors, usually
called detailing. In 1989, detailing accounted for three-quarters of
marketing expenses. Almost a quarter was devoted to advertising
in medical journals, with a small amount spent on direct mail
advertising. Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz, "Patent Expiration,
Entry, and Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry,"
p. 12.
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ignore major forms of investment by the pharma-
ceutical industry and may therefore not be the most
appropriate measure by which to judge competition
in this industry.17 Economists have found that prop-
erly measured, pharmaceutical company profits are
only slightly above the average for companies in all
industries.
Conventional accounting rules permit firms to
accumulate certain types of spending as capital as-
sets, but require other types to be deducted from
income in the year in which the expenditure is in-
curred. Expenditures for intangibles present special
problems. Clearly, in the right circumstances,
spending on marketing and R&D can benefit a com-
pany for years to come, just as it would benefit
from money spent on a manufacturing plant. In a
practical sense, such spending is an investment in
company assets. But conventional accounting prac-
tice does not classify it as such. Instead, accounting
practice treats it as a short-lived expense. Account-
ing measures of profitability are usually based on
the level of a firm's assets; expenses are deducted
from revenue to determine the profit level, which is
measured in relation to company gross or net assets.
Because industries vary in their level of R&D
and marketing, conventional accounting rules affect
their measures of profit differently. Firms in indus-
tries in which high levels of both R&D and market-
ing are important, such as the pharmaceutical indus-
try, may find their asset-based measures of profit
systematically overstated. Conventional accounting
more accurately measures assets and profits in such
industries as heavy manufacturing in which neither
R&D nor marketing has played an important role.
Recently, Kenneth Clarkson, an economist spe-
cializing in the field of intangible assets, analyzed
the effects of conventional accounting rules on the
stated profit rates of 113 firms in 14 industries, in-
cluding the pharmaceutical industry.18 He found
that the rules distorted the measures of profitability
in many industries, in different directions, and to
different degrees.
First, Clarkson measured the importance of
intangible assets in the pharmaceutical industry.
Using income tax and census data, he found that
among the 14 groups examined, the pharmaceutical
industry was one of three that spent the greatest
proportion, as a share of net sales, on marketing.
Similarly, his measure of R&D showed the pharma-
ceutical industry to be third highest in spending
share. He split R&D into its components, on the
grounds that each would turn out marketable prod-
ucts at a different rate. Significantly, based on pre-
vious studies of the economic life of R&D, he ar-
gued that R&D in the pharmaceutical industry trans-
lates into products (accumulates) at between one-
half and three-quarters of the rate of other high-
R&D industries, partly because of lags in regulatory
approval. Slower accumulation would mean that
the R&D assets in the pharmaceutical industry are
lower than their high share of sales would imply.
Next, Clarkson recalculated the rates of return
on assets and equity (including the intangible assets)
for the firms in these industries during the 1980-
1989 period. He found that when he corrected for
differing rates of investment in intangible assets, the
average return on equity for all 113 firms fell
slightly, from 14 percent to 11 percent. By con-
trast, the pharmaceutical industry's rate of return on
equity fell from 21 percent to 13 percent. Although
still higher than in most industries (it ranked third
highest, after computer software and foods), the rate
of return in the pharmaceutical industry was much
closer to the mean—2 percentage points, not 7 per-
centage points, higher.
Clarkson's results are higher than, but generally
consistent with, earlier studies that attempted similar
adjustments. In general, the earlier studies found
that (1) the measured pharmaceutical industry profit
rate declined by between 2 percentage points and 6
percentage points when intangible capital was ad-
17. F. M. Scherer, "Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the
Pharmaceutical Industry," Journal of Economic Perspectives
(Summer 1993), p. 104.
18. Kenneth Clarkson, "Intangible Capital and Profitability Measures:
Effects of Research and Promotion on Rates of Return" (paper
presented at the American Enterprise Institute Conference on
Competitive Strategies in the Pharmaceutical Industry, Washing-
ton, D.C., October 27-28, 1993).
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justed for and (2) despite this, the industry profit
rate remained above the average by 3 percentage
points. The Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) also sponsored an independent study of the
pharmaceutical industry's profitability, using a dif-
ferent methodology. This study's conclusions are
similar to Clarkson's.19
Thus, differing pictures of the pharmaceutical
industry emerge, depending on the measures of
profitability applied. The more conventional mea-
sures point to a very profitable industry in which
monopoly profits generated by patents raise the in-
dustry return to very high levels. A more sophis-
ticated look—one that more nearly matches the in-
dustry investment profile-shows a less but still
quite profitable industry, but one in which R&D
spending and patent rights generate imperfect com-
petition rather than monopoly. This latter picture is
consistent with the analysis presented later in this
report, which shows that the average new drug pro-
duces a small amount of excess profits; that is,
profits beyond those necessary to reward the inves-
tors after manufacturing and other costs have been
paid. These excess profits also help explain why
drug companies may have increased their R&D dra-
matically during the 1980s and why more firms are
seeking to enter the market.
The Role of R&D in the
Pharmaceutical Industry
The U.S. pharmaceutical industry has always in-
vested heavily in R&D. The process starts in the
laboratory with the discovery of chemicals and
19. See Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D,
pp. 96-99. In fairness, Clarkson's sample of companies is the
broadest, both within the pharmaceutical industry and generally, of
any study reviewed by OTA. See William Baber and Sok-Hyon
Kang, "Accounting-based Measures as Estimates of Economic
Rates of Return: The Case of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry,
1976-1987" (paper produced under contract with the Office of
Technology Assessment, July 1991).
Some people have argued that pharmaceutical companies have
greater profits, but that they dissipate these profits in R&D races
or by paying too much for the R&D they undertake. One study
examined by CBO suggested that fears about R&D races were
overstated. See Rebecca Henderson and Iain Cockburn, "Racing
to Invest? The Dynamics of Competition in Ethical Drug Discov-
ery" (Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge, Mass., May 1993).
Figure 5.
Research and Development Spending by the U.S.
Pharmaceutical Industry (In billions of dollars)
Billions of Dollars
12
10
8
6
4
1970
SOURCE:
1975 1980 1985 1990
Congressional Budget Office based on Pharmaceuti-
cal Manufacturers Association, Trends in U.S. Phar-
maceutical Sales and R&D (Washington, D.C.:
PMA, October 1993), p. 6.
molecules that have therapeutic potential, turns these
substances into products, and culminates in testing
on animals. Industry R&D then moves to clinical
trials, where first safety, then efficacy, of the prod-
ucts are tested in three phases on ever-increasing
numbers of people. Long-term animal trials typi-
cally continue during the human clinical trials.
Drugs that fail one step typically do not proceed to
the next.
Industry research and development (both foreign
and domestic) has increased continuously for the
last two decades, both in absolute terms and as a
percentage of sales (see Figures 5 and 6).20 At least
part of the increase in R&D is the result of rising
costs of clinical trials.21 Half of the industry R&D
20. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Trends in U.S. Phar-
maceutical Sales & R&D, pp. 4-8, and National Science Founda-
tion, Selected Data on Research and Development in Industry:
1991. Both sources agree roughly on patterns and trends in R&D
spending. There is a 15 percent discrepancy between the different
sources. The industry and NSF also have different classifications
for industry sales so their R&D-to-sales ratios differ.
21. Measured by number of clinical trials or patients per drug ap-
proval. Some analysts argue that these costs are rising because
the pharmaceutical industry is now grappling with more long-term
and complicated illnesses that do not lend themselves to straight-
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Figure 6.
Research and Development Spending
by the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry
(As a percentage of sales)
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cal Manufacturers Association, Trends in U.S. Phar-
maceutical Sales and R&D (Washington, D.C.:
PMA, October1993), p. 7.
expenses occur once clinical trials have begun.22
Furthermore, the share of trial-related expenses has
been rising over the last decade.
Although the federal government spends heavily
on biomedical research, it spends relatively little
directly on drug development. Overall, federal
agencies spent $750 million in clinical and preclini-
cal pharmaceutical evaluations in 1990.23 By com-
parison, the U.S. drug industry spent $10.8 billion
worldwide on pharmaceutical R&D for human use
in 1992.24
forward analysis. Boston Consulting Group, The Changing Envi-
ronment for U.S. Pharmaceuticals, pp. 25-32. OTA also finds that
the size of clinical trials is rising. Office of Technology Assess-
ment, Pharmaceutical R&D, pp. 64-65.
22. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Trends in U.S. Phar-
maceutical Sales & R&D, p. 29.
23. Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D, pp. 214-
215 and 311-315.
24. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Trends in U.S. Phar-
maceutical Sales & R&D, p. 26.
R&D and the Industry Cost Structure. It is well
known that researchers in the pharmaceutical indus-
try typically test thousands of chemicals in order to
find one that passes all the clinical trials and is fi-
nally approved by the FDA. It is less well known
that, on average, only 3 of 10 drugs approved by
the FDA and brought to market sell sufficiently well
to earn back the average investment in R&D for a
new drug, which includes the cost of the pharma-
ceuticals that do not even make it to market.25 Of
these three, in the recent past, only one has been a
principal source of industry income. Thus, a few
very successful discoveries provide most of the in-
come (see Figure 7).
As a share of sales price, pharmaceutical pro-
duction costs are low; the Office of Technology As-
sessment estimates that the share is 25 percent.26
One implication of this cost structure (high sunk
costs, low production costs) is that a larger pharma-
ceutical market (in terms of quantity) permits lower
prices because it allows the sunk costs, or money
that has already been committed and spent for R&D
costs, to be spread over a larger number of buyers.
For drugs marketed during the early 1980s, these
R&D costs, including funds spent during FDA clini-
cal trials, averaged close to $200 million per drug.27
Such costs are considered to be largely fixed, or
constant, because the R&D is the same whether the
company sells one or one billion pills.28
25. Henry Grabowski and John Vernon, "A New Look at the Risks
and Returns to Pharmaceutical R&D," Management Science (July
1990), p. 816. Analysts lack published data on costs by project;
only the average cost is available. Thus, a drug might still be
profitable even if sales do not cover the average amount spent on
R&D, but it is unlikely to be very profitable unless its R&D costs
are also very low.
26. Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D, p. 91.
This 25 percent includes plant depreciation. Pure variable costs
account for an estimated 17 percent to 21 percent of price. See
the discussion of the rate of return calculations below.
27. These costs are capitalized-that is, they included the time value of
money. Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D,
pp. 47-72.
28. There is some post-launch R&D-in enhancing production, for
example—that can be varied, especially during the early years of
the market. Obviously, there is R&D to sell improved versions of
a product. But since the improved version also has to be ap-
proved by the FDA, this analysis is considering it as a new prod-
uct. In addition, the marketing costs can largely be considered
fixed.
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Figure 7.
Sales of Ten Companies' Top Three Drugs as a Percentage of Prescription Sales by Each Firm
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SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Boston Consulting Group, The Changing Environment for U.S. Pharmaceuticals (New
York: Boston Consulting Group, April 1993), p. 41.
Consequently, it is often profitable for pharma-
ceutical companies to sell drugs at deep discounts as
long as the price is above the low cost of produc-
tion. The high level of fixed costs also helps to
explain why pharmaceutical companies try to mar-
ket their drugs worldwide, even in countries that
control prices; every foreign sale, even at a low
price, helps to pay not only for the low production
cost but also for the single large R&D investment.
The fact that pharmaceutical companies can offer
some consumers prices that they do not offer to oth-
ers also encourages discounting.
R&D and International Competition. U.S. phar-
maceutical companies are highly competitive in the
international marketplace. The strength of the U.S.
industry lies in its large R&D infrastructure and
ability to produce new products of high quality.
According to one recent survey, U.S. companies
developed 113 of the 265 major globally prescribed
drugs that were developed between January 1970
and May 1992.29 U.S. companies develop a smal-
ler share of all drugs, but produce almost half of all
new drugs sold in all major markets. This techno-
logical success (and the R&D that precedes it) is
not concentrated in a few therapeutic categories,
such as anti-infective and cardiovascular drugs, but
occurs in most major therapeutic categories.
In 1990, nine of the largest twenty pharmaceuti-
cal firms in the world were based in the Xlnited
States.30 According to the Department of Com-
merce, U.S. firms accounted for almost half of the
world's pharmaceutical sales on a value basis. And
the industry runs a positive balance of trade (that is,
exports exceed imports). Most of the U.S. pharma-
ceutical exports went to Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.
Almost half of U.S. exports went to the European
Community, which has several nations with strong
pharmaceutical industries.31
30. International Trade Commission, Global Competitiveness of U.S.
Advanced-Technology Manufacturing Industries: Pharmaceuticals,
p. 4-2.
29. Heinz Redwood, "New Drugs in the World Market," The Ameri-
can Enterprise (August 1993), pp. 72-80.
31. Department of Commerce, U.S. Industrial Outlook 1994 (January
1994), p. 43-2.
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The U.S. market accounts for one-third of world
pharmaceutical sales.32 Not all countries consume
the same drugs, however. Many drugs are local,
sold in protected or specialized markets. Global
drugs are those that are sold in all or most major
markets. The U.S. market for global drugs accounts
for an even larger fraction of world sales for these
drugs. Global drugs are usually considered more
technologically advanced. Because the U.S. market
possesses such a large fraction of the total sales of
these drugs, U.S. health policy may have a dispro-
portionate impact on the development of pharma-
ceuticals throughout the world. Alternatively, sales
abroad represent more than half of the market for
drugs patented in the United States and will there-
fore not be affected by health care reform.
Competition in the U.S.
Pharmaceutical Market
The U.S. pharmaceutical market has major structural
features on both the supply and demand sides that
impede the functioning of a perfectly competitive
market. These factors have served partially to shel-
ter firms in the industry from competition, as the
profit figures discussed above suggest. But changes
are taking place in the market, independent of pro-
posed federal policy changes, that are lowering
some of these impediments to competition.
Consumers' Insensitivity to Cost
One factor that exacerbates the imperfect competi-
tion is the presence of doctors in the decision-
making process. Doctors are relatively cost-insensi-
tive in prescribing medicine, for which they do not
pay. A doctor's objective is to treat the patient and
not necessarily to provide the most cost-effective
treatment.33 Since prescription drugs typically con-
stitute, in nonchronic cases, only a small fraction of
the total cost of treating the patient, the doctor's
incentive to examine drug costs declines even more.
Moreover, because the consumer often cedes large
parts of his or her decisionmaking power to a physi-
cian or other medical expert—and indeed is often not
in a position to judge the medical cost-benefit trade-
offs—the usual cost-controlling mechanisms of the
marketplace become less effective. The substitution
of generic drugs, which is at the patient's choice in
most states, is the major—and relatively recent-ex-
ception to the medical consumer's usual attitude
toward costs.
Nor is judging the cost-effectiveness of treat-
ment straightforward: different patients might value
the same costs differently. Some patients might
prefer more effective treatment at a higher cost,
while others might be willing to incur some risk to
save some money. Doctors, fearing malpractice
suits or perhaps a negative reputation based on
unsuccessful treatment, might also value the trade-
off between costs and risks differently.
Another element of the U.S. pharmaceutical
market that serves to make demand less sensitive to
price is the widespread coverage of pharmaceuticals
by insurance and other third-party payers. Although
only one-quarter of outpatient pharmaceutical ex-
penditures were covered by insurance in 1977, by
1987 more than 40 percent of all outpatient pre-
scription drug expenditures were covered by third-
party payers.34 Because patients are often reim-
bursed or because they only pay a small flat fee per
prescription, they do not respond as much to costs
as they would if they were bearing the full expense.
The presence of these cost-desensitizing factors,
however, does not mean that consumers ignore
price, just that they are less aware of it than they
otherwise might be. Many consumers have large
deductibles as well as coinsurance or copayments in
their pharmaceutical coverage, making them more
sensitive to cost. The result is that consumers bear
a much higher share of the expenditures for pre-
scription drugs than they do for physician or hospi-
tal services. In 1991, consumers paid out of pocket
for 55 percent of prescription drug expenditures, 18
percent of physician services, and 3 percent of hos-
32. "Single Digit Growth for World Pharma [sic] Market," Scrip Mag-
azine (January 1994), p. 32.
33. Doctors in managed health care provider groups may face differ-
ent incentives.
34. Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D, p. 239.
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pital services.35 And, as noted above, generic sub-
stitution is available in most states.
Changing Factors in the Market
The behavior of consumers and third-party payers is
changing. Third-party payers are increasing the
share of total prescription costs that they pay, but
also increasingly trying to rein in their costs. In
addition, consumers are increasing their use of ge-
neric substitutes.
Pharmaceutical Benefit Management. The desire
to control pharmaceutical costs has generated a
growing number of companies devoted to managing
pharmaceutical benefits for unions, insurance com-
panies, and large corporations. The net effect of
their efforts is to reduce pharmaceutical costs to the
consumer through increased use of generic drugs
and other techniques. (Managed care providers also
perform many of these cost-reducing functions with-
in their organizations.)
In a sense, these benefit-management companies
act as agents of the pharmaceutical-purchasing pub-
lic. They buy generic drugs where and when they
can. When generic drugs are not available, they use
buying power to get a good price, especially when
imitative drugs are available. In economic terms,
these techniques make demand for the products of
any drug manufacturer more elastic-that is, more
price sensitive—for whole segments of the popula-
tion. This greater price sensitivity lowers the mar-
ket power of a drug manufacturing firm by reducing
its ability to price its products above the unit cost,
which would be the price in a purely competitive
industry.
In order to wield this buying power, a benefit-
management firm has to press purchasing discipline
on doctors and patients. It can negotiate a signifi-
cantly better price with a drug company only if it
can ensure that its members will only buy specific
drugs. Among the tools at its disposal are approved
drug lists (often called formularies) and even elec-
tronic point-of-sale technology, so that the pharma-
cist can intervene to persuade doctor and patient to
use listed drugs. Similarly, organizations that man-
age prescription benefits can vary drug reim-
bursement for the patient according to the formu-
lary: a high percentage for drugs on the formulary,
a low percentage for drugs not on it. According to
some industry estimates, the majority of people who
have pharmaceutical benefits either have such re-
strictions on their benefits or will soon have them.
Even now, those companies that choose to can
enforce their restrictions in order to get the dis-
counts. Kaiser Permanente, the largest health main-
tenance organization in the United States, for in-
stance, distributes its formulary to its doctors, tracks
their prescribing behavior, restricts access to them
by representatives of pharmaceutical companies, and
provides information to them concerning the reasons
that certain drugs are on the formulary. Conse-
quently, as of May 1993, 96 percent of Kaiser's
prescriptions were from the formulary and 75 per-
cent of the prescriptions were for generic drugs.36
In general, however, it is difficult to estimate
how much consumers and third-party payers truly
have exercised buying power to reduce pharmaceuti-
cal costs. Although the trend seems to be definitely
in the direction of managing pharmaceutical bene-
fits, the actual carrying out of the demand manage-
ment techniques may still be sparse and uneven.
For example, a recent study in the Journal of the
American Medical Association suggests that market-
ing by pharmaceutical companies can influence the
inclusion of drugs on formularies, even when there
is little, if any, therapeutic advantage.37 The study
showed that doctors are still able to choose the
drugs they deem necessary for treating hospital pa-
tients, despite the attempts of hospital administrators
to limit pharmaceutical spending through approved
drug lists, and that doctors' decisions are substan-
tially influenced by direct contact with pharmaceuti-
cal companies.
35. Congressional Budget Office, Trends in Health Spending: An
Update (June 1993), pp. 56, 60, 66.
36. Sylvia Morrison, "Prescription Drug Prices: The Effect of
Generics, Formularies and Other Market Changes" (Congressional
Research Service, August 17, 1993).
37. About half of the doctors' requests for addition were for drugs
with some therapeutic advantage. Mary-Margaret Chren and C.
Seth Landefeld, "Physicians' Behavior and their Interactions with
Drug Companies," Journal of the American Medical Association
(March 2, 1994), pp. 684-689.
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The definitions of managed care are also murky.
Some traditional fee-for-service health plans have
managed drug benefits. Even when drug benefits
are managed, it does not necessarily mean that the
plan is exercising substantial market power on be-
half of consumers. For instance, although Merck
recently reported that fully half of its sales come
from managed care plans and that the company
expects this share to rise, the firm's definition of a
managed care plan is unclear.38
One factor limiting the further penetration of
formularies is the lack of reliable studies of cost-
effectiveness. The group with the largest individual
incentive to undertake such studies, the pharmaceu-
tical companies, is limited by FDA regulations that
require its promotional claims to be backed by high-
quality university studies, which are time-consuming
and expensive.39 The FDA must approve the
claims, a process that also takes time. All users,
including their agents in the health plans, may have
sufficient economic incentive to explore the cost-
effectiveness of medical procedures and drugs, but
they cannot do it individually. Thus, such research,
although growing rapidly, is still in its infancy.
Increasing Use of Generic Drugs. Another grow-
ing force in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry is the
increasing penetration of the market by generic
drugs. Under the Drug Price Competition and Pat-
ent Term Restoration Act of 1984, the Congress and
the Reagan Administration chose to make generic
drugs the principal cost containment vehicle in the
pharmaceutical market by establishing a shorter pro-
cess of regulatory approval for generic drugs. Con-
sequently, the market share of generic drugs has
been increasing. In 1980, generic drugs accounted
for 23.3 percent (in units) of all pharmaceuticals
sold in the United States.40 By 1991, generic drugs
accounted for a much higher share of the units sold
38. Michael Waldholz, "Pharmaceutical Firms' Profits Rise Expected
to be Slim," The Wall Street Journal, January 18, 1994, p. B12.
39. For one proposal, see John Calfee, "The Leverage Principle in
FDA Regulation of Information" (paper presented at the American
Enterprise Institute Conference on Competitive Strategies in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, Washington, D.C., October 27-28, 1993).
40. Alison Masson and Robert Steiner, Generic Substitution and Pre-
scription Drug Prices: Economic Effects of State Drug Product
Selection Laws (Federal Trade Commission, 1985), p. 1113.
—almost 40 percent, according to one estimate.41
(In terms of value, generic drugs represented 13
percent of U.S. sales in 1989.)42
The existing group of generic drugs is large and
should grow further over the next several years be-
cause many brand-name pharmaceuticals will be
losing their patent protection. Drugs losing their
patents between 1992 and 2000 include 54 of the
100 most popular drugs and account for an approxi-
mately equal share of such sales. Furthermore, only
one of the 10 most widely used drugs will not lose
its patent between now and 2000. That drug is
Zantac, and although it is not losing its patent, its
closest competitor, Tagamet, did this year.43 Be-
cause of the number of important drugs that will
lose their patents during the early 1990s, the reve-
nue share filled by generic drugs is expected to rise
to more than one-quarter of the market by the mid-
dle of this decade.44
The market-based movement towards generic
drugs is likely to lower the profitability of invest-
ment in R&D less than regulatory or government-
based attempts at cost containment. One reason is
that generic versions of a pharmaceutical product
come at the end of its patent life, which means that
the present value of the lost sales is lower than if
the generics could compete right away. By contrast,
rebates, such as those currently given drugs paid for
by Medicaid and proposed by the Administration for
Medicare, are given from the date of introduction of
a new drug and have a higher present value. Thus,
an immediate rebate is likely to have a larger effect
on the expected profitability of a drug than will its
eventual displacement by generic equivalents. Simi-
larly, other aspects of the Administration's proposal
41. Morrison, "Prescription Drug Prices," p. 1.
42. International Trade Commission, Global Competitiveness of U.S.
Advanced-Technology Manufacturing Industries: Pharmaceuticals,
pp. 4-3 and 4-4.
43. "100 Powerhouse Drugs," Med Ad News Supplement (May 1993),
pp. S5 and S30. In addition, there is a lawsuit regarding the status
of the patent on Zantac.
44. International Trade Commission, Global Competitiveness of U.S.
Advanced-Technology Manufacturing Industries: Pharmaceuticals,
pp. 4-3 and 4-4.
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that have an immediate impact on a drug's price probably best be described as imperfectly competi-
would be more likely to affect the profit on invest- tive: firms have some power to raise prices and gen-
ment in R&D than would competition from a erate excess profits. But events in the pharmaceuti-
generic. cal market—including growth in generic drug use
and more use of collective buying strength on the
part of third-party payers—are beginning to under-
mine this power and make the industry more com-
petitive.
In the continuum between a perfect monopoly and
perfect competition, the pharmaceutical industry can
Chapter Three
How the Administration's Proposal
Would Affect the Demand
for Prescription Drugs
O f all the features of the Administration'sproposed health care plan, universal cover-age would have the greatest impact on the
demand for prescription drugs. If it were enacted,
this provision would extend a comprehensive pack-
age of health benefits, including coverage of pre-
scription drugs, to the entire under-65 population,
including 37 million people who are currently unin-
sured. The Administration's proposal for health
care reform would also add a new drug benefit to
Medicare, which is now the primary source of
health insurance coverage for the 65-and-older pop-
ulation. Just under one-half of the 65-and-over
population would receive drug coverage for the first
time.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that
a universal entitlement to the standard benefit pack-
age in the Administration's proposal would increase
spending on all prescription drugs by approximately
3 percent to 5 percent.1 The proposed Medicare
drug benefit would increase spending on all pre-
scription drugs by an additional 1 percent. A high
level of uncertainty underlies these estimates of
what economists call induced demand.
CBO's estimates do not consider the effect that
a greater shift to managed care plans might have on
prescription drug expenditures. Prescription drug
expenditures in managed care plans might be higher
or lower than those in fee-for-service plans. Man-
aged care plans might substitute prescription drugs
for more expensive forms of treatment, thereby in-
creasing prescription drug expenditures. But man-
aged care plans might also exercise greater control
over prescriptions, using generic drugs more inten-
sively than fee-for-service plans, a policy that could
lower prescription drug expenditures. CBO has not
attempted to quantify these possible effects.
CBO's induced demand estimates are based on
expenditures for outpatient prescription drugs re-
ported in the 1987 National Medical Expenditure
Survey.2 These expenditures were not inflated to
1994 dollars because the induced demand estimates
were based on the percentage of difference in aver-
age expenditures among groups. The estimates
were calculated using the average percentage of dif-
ference in outpatient drug expenditures among peo-
ple with different types of health coverage. These
average expenditures have been adjusted for differ-
ences in population characteristics, specifically those
according to health status, age, family income, sex,
race and ethnicity, marital status, education, employ-
ment status, and region of residence. Under-
reporting is a problem in this survey, but does not
affect CBO's analysis insofar as it is evenly spread
among subgroups.
It is the combination of a universal entitlement with a generous
benefit package (offering both comprehensive physician and drug
coverage) that leads to CBO's estimate of induced demand. For
the sake of brevity, this will be referred to as the universal cover-
age provision of the Administration's proposal.
2. This is a representative survey of the noninstitutionalized popula-
tion in the United States. The tabulated results for prescription
drug expenditures for 65-and-over Medicare enrollees were re-
ported in the Congressional Budget Office study, Updated Esti-
mates of Medicare's Catastrophic Drug Insurance Program (Octo-
ber 1989).
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The Administration's
Proposal for Universal
Coverage
The extension of health coverage to all U.S. resi-
dents primarily affects the under-65 population be-
cause Medicare already covers 98 percent of the 65-
and-over population.3 Almost all uninsured U.S.
residents are under age 65. CBO projects that the
universal coverage component of the Administra-
tion's proposal (which includes a drug benefit)
would increase the expenditures for prescription
drugs by the under-65 population by 5 percent to 7
percent. Most of the increase would result from
extending coverage to those who are currently unin-
sured and only a small fraction from currently in-
sured people who would be receiving better drug
benefits under the proposed standard benefit pack-
age. The increase would occur mostly in outpatient
rather than inpatient prescription drugs. The under-
65 population accounts for about two-thirds of all
prescription drug expenditures.4 Universal coverage
would therefore increase total prescription drug ex-
penditures by an estimated 3 percent to 5 percent.
Proposed Coverage
Under the Administration's proposal, the under-65
population would be covered by one of three basic
plans, each of which would include coverage for
both physician visits and outpatient prescription
drugs. Much of the under-65 population already
has employment-based physician and drug coverage
that is similar to the coverage in the Administra-
tion's proposal.
The three basic types of plan included in the
Administration's proposal are:
4.
Health Care Financing Administration, Medicare and Medicaid
Statistical Supplement (1992), p. 14. Table 1 reports a lower
number (96 percent) because it includes only those who obtain
their primary coverage through Medicare.
Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs,
Risks and Rewards (February 1993), p. 239.
o A lower-cost-sharing plan that would employ a
network of providers and require small copay-
ments for most services;
o A higher-cost-sharing plan, under which patients
would choose their providers, meet a deductible
before coverage begins, and pay a coinsurance
rate thereafter; and
o A combination plan under which patients would
pay the lower-cost-sharing rates only if they use
network providers, but would pay the higher-
cost-sharing rates if they do not.
The lower-cost-sharing plan would require a $5
copayment for prescriptions and a $10 copayment
for physician visits. The higher-cost-sharing plan
would require that patients spend $300 on health
services before physician coverage begins and $250
on prescription drugs before that coverage begins.
A coinsurance rate of 20 percent would apply there-
after to most expenditures. One important advan-
tage of the lower-cost-sharing plan would be that it
has no deductibles. Each plan would limit annual
out-of-pocket expenditures to $1,500 for individuals
and $3,000 for families.
CBO did not determine which of the three kinds
of plans would attract the most enrollees. The
outcome would depend on how the public perceives
differences in quality of care and how premiums
vary among plan types (and within each regional
alliance). CBO did not estimate how prescription
drug expenditures would differ between the lower-
and higher-cost-sharing plans. CBO's calculation of
induced demand does not address the differences in
coverage among the three kinds of plans.
Drug expenditures could be higher under the
lower-cost-sharing plan for two reasons. First, the
lower-cost-sharing plan would have no deductibles.
In other words, coverage would begin with the
enrollee's first physician visit and first prescription.
Since the consumption of prescription drugs is
closely associated with physician visits, this kind of
coverage would tend to increase drug expenditures.5
It is possible for those enrolled in fee-for-service plans to purchase
supplemental coverage for cost sharing, in which case initial cov-
erage would be as good as in the lower-cost-sharing plan.
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Second, the lower-cost-sharing plan is likely to be a
managed care plan such as a health maintenance or-
ganization (HMO), which may use prescription
drugs more intensively. Nevertheless, drug expendi-
tures in the lower-cost-sharing plan could be lower
if it exercises greater control over prescription
choice.
Employment-Based Coverage
According to the 1990 Current Population Survey,
two-thirds of the population under age 65 obtain
their primary health insurance coverage through
their employers. The Administration's proposal for
comprehensive coverage is roughly equivalent to
that of many employment-based plans. This simi-
larity implies that the prescription drug expenditures
of people who are insured through their employers
would not increase because their coverage would
not change appreciably.
Employees who are now insured through firms
employing more than 100 workers have coverage
that is, for the most part, at least as good as that
proposed in the higher-cost-sharing plan. According
to a recent Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) publi-
cation that examines the health insurance benefits in
firms employing 100 or more workers, 83 percent
of full-time employees are covered by health insur-
ance. Of those covered, two-thirds are in fee-for-
service plans, 16 percent are in preferred provider
organizations, and 15 percent are in HMOs. The
average deductible is $198 and only 6 percent of
those insured have a deductible of $300 or more.6
The most common coinsurance rate is 20 percent,
and all but 12 percent of those insured through a
large employer have a coinsurance rate of 20 per-
cent or less. Only 4 percent of people insured by
these firms do not have outpatient prescription drug
coverage. The fee-for-service plans typically do not
have a separate deductible for prescription drugs,
which means that their drug coverage is usually
slightly better than the proposal's higher-cost-
sharing plan.7 Apparently, deductible and copay-
ment policies covering drugs and physician visits
are slightly more generous under the employment-
based plans than they would be under the higher-
cost-sharing plan proposed by the Administration,
but are not usually as generous as the lower-cost-
sharing plan.
Coverage is similar for people who are insured
through firms that employ fewer than 100 workers.
According to another BLS survey, although a lower
proportion of full-time workers in these establish-
ments have coverage through their employers (69
percent), people who are covered often have bene-
fits similar to those of employees in larger compa-
nies. The average deductible is $197 and coinsur-
ance rates of 20 percent are common. All but 3
percent of those insured have prescription drug cov-
erage.8 People who are insured through their em-
ployers would therefore probably not increase their
prescription drug expenditures because their current
coverage is usually about as good as that proposed
by the Administration.
Outpatient Drug Demand and the
Uninsured Under-65 Population
Increased demand for prescription drugs would re-
sult largely from extending coverage to the 17 per-
cent of the population under age 65, or 37 million
people, who have no health insurance (see Table 1).
Those whose physician coverage would improve
under the Administration's proposal or who cur-
rently do not have outpatient drug coverage would
also increase their demand for prescription drugs.
This outcome may apply to that portion of the pop-
ulation (7 percent) who are covered by policies that
are privately purchased. The remaining three-quar-
ters of the under-65 population already have physi-
cian and drug coverage through their employers or
Medicaid that is for the most part as generous as
that in the proposal's higher-cost-sharing plan. (The
drug coverage currently provided by Medicaid typi-
cally has lower cost-sharing requirements than that
proposed by the Administration.)
6. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in Medium and
Large Private Establishments, 1991 (May 1993).
7. Cathy Baker and Natalie Kramer, "Employer-Sponsored Prescrip-
tion Drug Benefits," Monthly Labor Review (February 1991),
states that fee-for-service plans generally do not have a separate
drug deductible, based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics results.
8. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in Small Private
Establishments, 1990 (September 1991).
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The amount by which prescription drug expen-
ditures would rise if coverage were extended to the
uninsured can be estimated using the outpatient pre-
scription drug expenditures reported in the 1987
National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES).
According to this survey, average outpatient pre-
scription drug expenditures for an uninsured person
under 65 were about $35 in 1987. After adjusting
for differences in population characteristics between
the uninsured and those with employment-based
coverage, CBO estimates that the uninsured under-
Table 1.
Primary Source of Health Insurance for the U.S.
Noninstitutionalized Population, by Age, 1993
Source of Insurance Total
Under
65
65 and
Over
Population in Millions
Employment-Based
Medicare
Medicaid
Department of
Veterans Affairs5
Other Private
None
Total
147.8
32.5
20.5
0.8
15.1
37.4
254.2
146.4
3.6
20.5
0.8
15.0
37.1
223.4
Percentage of Age Group
Employment-Based 58 66
Medicare 13 2
Medicaid 8 9
Department of
Veterans Affairs6 c c
Other Private 6 7
None 15 17
Total 100 100
1.4
28.9
a
a
0.1
0.4
30.8
5
94
c
c
c
1
100
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office tabulation of March
1993 Current Population Survey.
a. Less than 25,000.
b. Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Department of
Veterans Affairs and the Civilian Health and Medical Program
of the Uniformed Services.
c. Less than one-half of one percent.
65 population would have spent an average of about
$62 per person (in 1987) if their coverage had been
similar to that of those who had employment-based
coverage.9 This amount represents a 77 percent in-
crease in outpatient prescription drug expenditures.
The comprehensive coverage proposed by the
Administration is analogous to that of many em-
ployment-based plans. Logic would therefore sug-
gest that the uninsured could increase their outpa-
tient prescription drug consumption by approxi-
mately 77 percent under the Administration's pro-
posal. Allowing for as much as a 25 percent error
in this estimate indicates that the uninsured may
increase their prescription drug expenditures by 58
percent to 96 percent under the Administration's
proposal. This range is in line with other CBO esti-
mates. Also based on the NMES, CBO has esti-
mated that the uninsured would spend 57 percent
more on all medical care if they were insured—a
figure that is close to the lower end of the estimated
range of increase.10 Previous research by CBO and
RAND indicates that prescription drug expenditures
are closely tied to coverage of physician visits.11
CBO has also estimated that the uninsured would
spend 97 percent more on professional health ser-
vices if they were insured. It might be reasonable
to expect a similar increase in prescription drug ex-
penditures.
Uninsured people constitute 17 percent of the
under-65 population, but according to NMES they
9. The NMES expenditures were also adjusted upward by 10 percent
to compensate for underreporting of drug expenses. The results of
Marc Berk, Claudia Schur, and Penny Mohr, "Using Survey Data
to Estimate Prescription Drug Costs," Health Affairs (Fall 1990),
suggest that underreporting is larger as a percentage of average
expenditures for those with low drug expenditures. This type of
underreporting would tend to bias the induced demand calculation
upward.
10. Congressional Budget Office, "Behavioral Assumptions for Esti-
mating the Effects of Health Care Proposals," CBO Memorandum
(November 1993). These estimates assume that the uninsured
receive coverage similar to that currently provided by employ-
ment-based plans.
11. Congressional Budget Office, Updated Estimates of Medicare's
Catastrophic Drug Insurance Program. The RAND studies in-
clude Willard Manning and others, "Health Insurance and the
Demand for Medical Care," American Economic Review, vol. 77,
no. 3 (1987), and Arleen Leibowitz, Willard Manning, and Joseph
Newhouse, "The Demand for Prescription Drugs as a Function of
Cost-Sharing," Social Science and Medicine, vol. 21, no. 10
(1985).
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Table 2.
Induced Demand for Prescription Drugs by the Under-65 Population
Under the Administration's Proposal for Universal Coverage (In percent)
Insurance Status
Share of
Under-65
Population
Assumed Increase
in Outpatient
Prescription Drug
Expenditures
Estimated Increase in Expenditures
of the Under-65 Population
For Outpatient For All
Prescription Prescription
Drugs Drugs*
Uninsured
Employment-Based Insurance
Without a Drug Benefit
17 58 to 96
7.5 to 15
4.5 to 7*
0.2 to 0.3
4to6c
0.1 to 0.3
Privately Purchased
Health Coverage
Total
7
26
7.5 to 15
n.a.
0.5 to 1
5 to 8
0.4 to 0.8
5 to 7
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
NOTE: n.a. = not applicable.
a. Outpatient prescription drugs make up approximately three-quarters of the sales of all prescription drugs. Column 4 equals 77 percent of
column 3.
b. This group accounts for only 8 percent of outpatient drug expenditures of the under-65 population. Calculation: (0.08)(58 to 96) = (4.5
to 7). The 8 percent is calculated by dividing the average expenditures of the uninsured by the average expenditures of all people under
65 (both according to the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey), then multiplying the result by the share of the population that is
uninsured. Calculation: (35/76)(0.17) = 0.08.
c. Includes 0.6 percent from the increase in inpatient prescription drug expenditures.
account for only 8 percent of the outpatient pre-
scription drug expenditures of this age group. If the
uninsured were to increase their prescription drug
expenditures by 58 percent to 96 percent, outpatient
prescription drug expenditures of the entire under-65
population would increase by 4.5 percent to 7 per-
cent (see Table 2).
Outpatient Drug Demand
and Improved Coverage
The Administration's proposal would improve the
coverage of people who are currently insured
through their employers but lack drug benefits. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that 3 percent
to 4 percent of those with employment-based plans
had no prescription drug coverage in 1991.12 This
group constitutes approximately 2 percent of the
under-65 population (3.5 percent of 66 percent).
CBO assumes, based on the NMES data, that add-
ing a drug benefit alone to a group that already has
physician coverage would increase outpatient pre-
scription drug expenditures by 7.5 percent to 15
percent.13 Giving a drug benefit to the 2 per-
12. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in Medium and
Large Private Establishments, 1991. Four percent of those who
have employment-based health coverage through firms employing
fewer than 100 workers also had no prescription drug coverage.
See BLS, Employee Benefits in Small Private Establishments,
1990.
13. See the discussion below on the increase in prescription drug
expenditures for the 65-and-over population that currently has
coverage only through Medicare.
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cent of the population who have only physician
coverage through their employers is likely to in-
crease the total outpatient demand of the under-65
population for prescription drugs by less than 1 per-
cent.
Both physician and drug coverage would gener-
ally improve for the portion of the population that
has private insurance. Privately purchased health
coverage is often not as extensive as employment-
based coverage. Nonetheless, the effects on the de-
mand of the under-65 population for drugs pre-
scribed on an outpatient basis would be relatively
small because the group constitutes only 7 percent
of its age category. If many in this group were to
receive better physician and drug coverage, the per-
centage of increase in prescription drug expenditures
should be close to the 7.5 percent to 15 percent cal-
culated for those who already have adequate physi-
cian but not drug coverage. CBO assumes that un-
der the Administration's proposal those who have
private coverage would also increase their outpatient
prescription drug expenditures by 7.5 percent to 15
percent. If that took place, the result would be an
increase in demand of about 1 percent for outpatient
prescription drugs by the entire under-65 population.
Inpatient Drug Demand
If the Administration's proposal for universal cover-
age were enacted, those who are currently uninsured
would also expand their inpatient use of pharmaceu-
ticals because they would tend to increase their use
of hospital services. According to calculations
based on the NMES, those who were not insured
spent $330 a year in 1987 on hospital services (in-
patient, outpatient, and emergency). If their cover-
age had been comparable to an employment-based
plan, they would have spent $424 a year (adjusting
for differences in population characteristics)-an in-
crease of 28 percent. The uninsured account for
about 10 percent of total hospital expenditures.
Thus, a 28 percent increase in hospital expenditures
by those who are currently uninsured implies that
total hospital expenditures could rise by approxi-
mately 3 percent.14 Assuming that inpatient pre-
scription drug expenditures are a constant proportion
of all hospital outlays, expenditures for inpatient
prescription drugs could also rise by about 3 per-
cent. Because the hospital market is roughly 23
percent of the total prescription drug market, the
total prescription drug expenditures for the under-65
population would increase by less than 1 percent
(0.6 percent).
Total Increase in Demand for
the Under-65 Population
Taken together, these calculations indicate that all
prescription drug expenditures of the under-65 pop-
ulation might rise from 5 percent to 7 percent if the
comprehensive coverage included in the Administra-
tion's proposal for health care reform were extended
to this entire age group (see the last column of
Table 2). The estimate does not take into account
the effect that a large shift to managed care plans
might have on the demand for prescription drugs.
Nor does it account for a greater use of generic
drugs. Because of the uncertainties involved in the
induced demand calculations, Chapter 6 considers a
broader range of changes.
Medicare's New Drug
Benefit
The Administration's proposal would add a new
drug benefit to Medicare. Because this would give
many Medicare enrollees drug coverage for the first
time, the demand for pharmaceuticals would in-
crease. CBO estimates that the demand for outpa-
tient prescription drugs by the 65-and-over popula-
tion would rise by about 4 percent as a result of
expanded Medicare coverage. Because the outpa-
tient market constitutes 77 percent of all prescrip-
tion drug expenditures, and the 65-and-over popula-
tion accounts for one-third of all spending on pre-
scription drugs, the new Medicare drug benefit
would increase total U.S. expenditures on prescrip-
14. The calculation: 10 percent of 28 percent is 2.8 percent (rounded
to 3 percent). The 10 percent is calculated by dividing average
expenditures for the uninsured on hospital services by average
expenditures of the entire under-65 population on hospital services
and multiplying that result by the proportion of the population
uninsured in 1993, that is ($330/$551)*0.17 = 0.1.
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tion drugs by 1 percent. About 1 percent of the
under-65 population is also insured through Medi-
care. Therefore, this new drug benefit would also
have a very small effect on the prescription drug
expenditures of those who are under 65.
Under the Administration's proposal, the new
prescription drug benefit would require a patient to
meet a $250 deductible before prescription drug
coverage begins and would apply a 20 percent coin-
surance rate thereafter. The benefit would include
an annual catastrophic cap of $1,000; once the pa-
tient had spent $1,000 on prescription drugs, all fur-
ther expenditures on prescription drugs would be
covered in full.
There are currently two types of Medicare cov-
erage: Hospital Insurance (HI) and Supplementary
Medical Insurance (SMI). Hospital Insurance is
available to all Social Security beneficiaries and
requires no premium. Those who are 65 and over
and are not eligible for Social Security may buy HI
at a monthly premium of $245. Hospital Insurance
covers inpatient hospital services, some skilled nurs-
ing facility services, and hospice care. Enrollment
in the SMI program is voluntary and requires a pre-
mium ($41.10 a month). Even people 65 and over
who are not eligible for Social Security can buy
SMI coverage at the regular premium. Supplemen-
tary Medical Insurance covers physician visits, out-
patient hospital services, and laboratory services
after a $100 deductible is met. SMI covers 96 per-
cent of Medicare enrollees who are 65 and over.15
The proposed drug benefit would be added to this
second part of Medicare. The current SMI premium
is set to cover one-fourth of the cost of the benefits
and the federal government pays the rest. The SMI
premium would be increased to cover one-fourth of
the cost of this new drug benefit.16
The proposed Medicare drug benefit plan would
encourage substitution of generic drugs. For multi-
source drugs, the reimbursement limit would be
based on the wholesale price of the drug that falls
in the middle of the group when drugs are ranked
15. Health Care Financing Administration, Medicare and Medicaid
Statistical Supplement, p. 14.
16. The increase would be larger for very high-income Medicare
enrollees.
by price (the median price). A drug is classified as
multisource if other bioequivalent substances are on
the market, a situation that occurs either because the
patent has been licensed so that more than one
brand-name version exists, or because the patent has
expired and there are generic substitutes. If there
are more generic than brand-name forms of the
drug, the reimbursement limit would be determined
by a generic drug. In this instance, a Medicare pa-
tient would have to pay extra for choosing a brand-
name drug. The reimbursement limit would also
apply when calculating the amount spent to reach
the $250 deductible. This lower reimbursement
limit on multisource brand-name drugs, however,
would not apply if the physician specifically pre-
scribes the brand-name drug.
CBO did not take into account greater substitu-
tion of generic drugs in its induced demand calcula-
tions. The most important reason for excluding ge-
neric substitution from the induced demand esti-
mates was not because it was difficult to gauge.
Generic substitution begins to erode sales only after
the brand-name drug's patent has expired (or the
patent on one of its brand-name competitors has ex-
pired). During the first 7 to 12 years that a brand-
name drug is on the market, it will not usually face
competition from generic substitutes. If induced
demand is estimated at 5 percent, a brand-name
drug's sales should increase by an average of 5 per-
cent in the years before generic competition is
faced. When analyzing the changes in returns from
drug development, CBO took into account increased
substitution of generic drugs by examining greater
sales erosion at the end of a brand-name drug's life,
rather than by lowering the induced demand esti-
mate.
Calculating Induced Demand
Most Medicare enrollees (96 percent) participate in
the SMI program. They must meet a $100 deduct-
ible before coverage begins. Thereafter, a 20 per-
cent coinsurance rate applies, Thus, almost all
Medicare enrollees are covered for physician visits
and other basic health services, even if they do not
carry supplemental coverage. In 1991, only 11 per-
cent of 65-and-over Medicare enrollees had no cov-
erage supplementing Medicare (see Table 3).
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Table 3.
Induced Demand for Outpatient Prescription Drugs by Medicare Enrollees 65 and Over
Share of Total
65-and-Over
Medicare
Enrollees8
Insurance Status (Percent)
Average
Outpatient Drug
Expenditures
per Enrollee
in 1987b
(Dollars)
Assumed
Increase in
Outpatient Drug
Expenditures
(Percent)
Corresponding
Increase in Total
Outpatient Drug
Expenditures of
65-and-Over
Medicare
Enrollees6
(Percent)
Supplemental Coverage
Individually purchased (medigap)
Employment-based retirement plans
Medicaid: dual eligibles
Qualified Medicare beneficiaries
Other
No Supplemental Coverage
Total
37
38d
9
3
2
11
100
267
287"
292
N.A.
N.A.
179
n.a.
7.5
0
0
7.5
7.5
7.5 to 15
n.a.
2.7
0
0
0.2
0.1
0.7 to 1.3
3.7 to 4.4
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office. Column 1 is based on George S. Chulis and others, "Health Insurance and the Elderly," Health
Affairs (Spring 1993).
NOTE: N.A. = not available; n.a. = not applicable.
a. Based on Round 1 of the 1991 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (from Chulis and others). Includes the institutionalized population.
b. Based on the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey. Adjusted to control for health status, age, family income, sex, race and
ethnicity, marital status, education, employment status, and region of residence. Adjusted upward by 10 percent to account for under-
reporting. Underreporting will not affect the analysis insofar as it is evenly spread among subgroups.
c. Column 4 equals column 1 times column 3 times average expenditures of subgroup divided by average expenditures of all 65 and over
Medicare enrollees. 2.7 equals (0.37)(7.5)(0.99) and 0.7 to 1.3 equals (0.11)(7.5 to 15)(0.77). Total has been rounded.
d. Includes 5 percent who have both employment-based and individually purchased supplemental coverage.
e. People with union-based retirement plans, which tend to have more generous benefits than employer-based retirement plans, are not
included in this average.
Supplemental coverage picks up the coinsurance
payments (and occasionally the $100 deductible)
required by Medicare and may offer such additional
benefits as drug coverage. Thirty-seven percent of
65-and-over Medicare enrollees had supplemental
coverage through individually purchased plans
(medigap) in 1991. Most of these plans do not of-
fer a drug benefit.17 If a drug benefit were added to
Medicare, those people who do not have supple-
mental coverage and those who have only private
medigap coverage would increase their demand for
Pharmaceuticals.
People who have employment-based retirement
plans typically have both supplemental physician
and drug coverage. The employment-based retire-
ment plans generally do not have a separate deduct-
17. One estimate, based on the NMES, states that 19 percent of those
people who have purchased medigap plans individually have pre-
scription drug coverage. See Stephen H. Long, "Prescription
Drugs and the Elderly: Issues and Options," Health Affairs (Spring
1994), p. 161. Currently, the only drug coverage that a private
supplemental medigap plan may offer has a separate $250 deduct-
ible and a 50 percent coinsurance rate.
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ible for prescription drugs and some require that
beneficiaries pay only $1 to $4 per prescription.18
Currently, 74 percent of people who work for firms
employing 100 workers or more and who will ob-
tain health benefits from their employers on retire-
ment at age 65 will see little change in their cover-
age.19 Such evidence suggests that the drug cover-
age offered by employment-based retirement plans
is usually as generous as the proposed Medicare
drug benefit. Therefore, no change in demand is
predicted for this group.
Private Supplemental Coverage (Medigap). Retir-
ees age 65 and over who have employment-based
plans spend 7.5 percent more on outpatient prescrip-
tion drugs than those who are insured through medi-
gap plans (see Table 3). The increase is probably
attributable to the addition of drug coverage; em-
ployment-based retirement plans typically offer a
prescription drug benefit and most medigap plans do
not. CBO therefore concludes that the expenditures
for outpatient prescription drugs by 65-and-over
Medicare enrollees who are insured through supple-
mentary plans that do not frequently offer drug ben-
efits would increase by 7.5 percent if the proposed
prescription drug benefit were added to Medicare.
Enrollees who have supplementary coverage that is
equal to or better than the proposed drug benefit are
not expected to change their spending on drugs.
Those Eligible for Both Medicare and Medicaid.
Qualified Medicare beneficiaries (QMBs) constitute
another group of people who have supplemental
coverage but no drug benefits. These Medicare en-
rollees also qualify for assistance from Medicaid,
but are not eligible for Medicaid's drug benefit.
The income ceiling for QMBs was phased in at 85
percent of the poverty line in 1989 and reached 100
percent of the poverty line in 1992. It will rise to
120 percent of the poverty line in 1995. For those
in this group who are at or below the poverty line,
Medicaid picks up the premiums, coinsurance, and
deductibles required by Medicare's Supplementary
Medical Insurance program. Medicaid picks up
only the Medicare premium for those with incomes
above the poverty line (hence these QMBs have no
Medicaid coverage supplementing Medicare's cost-
sharing requirements). Because the QMB program
did not exist in 1987, the increase in the number of
Medicare enrollees who were also eligible for Med-
icaid between 1987 and 1991 can be viewed as a
first approximation of the size of the QMB popula-
tion. According to the 1987 NMES survey, 7.6 per-
cent of Medicare enrollees were also eligible for
Medicaid (these were all dual eligibles). According
to the 1991 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey,
11.9 percent of Medicare enrollees were also cov-
ered by Medicaid—an increase of 4 percentage
points.
Since the number of dual eligibles did not in-
crease much between 1987 and 1991, CBO viewed
the 4 percentage point rise as indicative of the por-
tion of the 65-and-over population who are QMBs
with incomes at or below the poverty line. (All
QMBs had incomes at or below the poverty line in
1991.) Some of this 4 percentage point increase,
however, occurred because the institutionalized
Medicare population was counted in the 1991 sur-
vey but not in 1987. The portion of this group that
qualifies for Medicaid is greater than that of the
entire 65-and-over population. Hence, the number
of QMBs may have been lower than 4 percent of all
65-and-over Medicare beneficiaries in 1991.20
For the purpose of this induced demand calcula-
tion, CBO assumes that the number of QMBs at or
below the poverty line is equal to 3 percent of all
65-and-over Medicare enrollees. Because this
group, like most of those who have private supple-
mental insurance, has supplemental physician cover-
age but no drug coverage, CBO assumes that people
in it would also increase their outpatient prescription
drug expenditures by 7.5 percent if the proposed
drug benefit were added to Medicare.
18. Congressional Budget Office, Updated Estimates of Medicare's
Catastrophic Drug Insurance Program, p. 51.
19. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in Medium and
Large Private Establishments, 7997, Table 63.
20. Based on state-level data obtained from the Health Care Financing
Administration, the Congressional Research Service reports that
the number of QMBs was 1.3 million in 1992, or almost 4 percent
of the Medicare population. See Congressional Research Service,
Medicaid Source Book: Background Data and Analysis (January
1993). This number includes many people who not only qualified
for Medicaid under the QMB standards but also were eligible for
Medicaid's drug benefit. At the same time there were reporting
problems that could make this estimate too low.
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Other Supplemental Coverage. The induced de-
mand estimate presumes that people who have some
type of unspecified supplemental coverage would
also increase their outpatient drug expenditures by
7.5 percent if the drug benefit were added to Medi-
care. The group is so small, however, that the ef-
fect on the induced demand estimate is slight.
Those Without Any Supplemental Coverage. It is
assumed that people who have no supplemental cov-
erage would increase their outpatient prescription
drug expenditures by 7.5 percent to 15 percent un-
der the Administration's proposed Medicare drug
benefit. Medicare enrollees who are 65 years old
and older, and who have supplemental coverage
through employment-based retirement plans, spend
an average of 60 percent more on prescription drugs
than those who have no supplemental coverage (see
Table 3). But a large part of this difference is at-
tributable not to drug coverage but to the fact that
many employment-based retirement plans offer sup-
plemental coverage that picks up some of Medi-
care's cost-sharing requirements. The Administra-
tion's proposal affects drug coverage, but for the
most part not Medicare's deductibles and copay-
ments.21 It is therefore necessary to determine the
portion of this 60 percent difference that stems from
drug coverage alone.
Medicare enrollees who are 65 and over and
have employment-based retirement plans spend
about 7.5 percent more on prescription drugs than
those who have private supplemental coverage
(medigap), which usually does not include drug
coverage. Therefore, it is assumed that at least 7.5
percentage points of the 60 percent difference is
attributable to drug coverage.22 Another argument
suggests that up to 10 percentage points of the 60
percent difference could be attributed to prescription
drug coverage. Those who have no supplemental
coverage would have to spend 50 percent more on
prescription drugs to catch up with those who have
medigap coverage, plus an additional 10 percent to
catch up with those whose coverage is employment
based (and who usually have a drug benefit). In
addition, private medigap plans may pick up the
coinsurance payments required by SMI more often
than employment-based plans. Those who have
medigap coverage may spend almost as much on
prescription drugs as those who have employment-
based plans, partly because they have better physi-
cian coverage. It follows that the amount of the 60
percent difference that is attributable to drug cover-
age could be greater than 10 percentage points.
According to CBO tabulations of NMES data,
people who have no supplemental coverage pur-
chased an average of 12 prescriptions a year, where-
as retirees who have employment-based supplemen-
tal coverage bought an average of 16.6 prescriptions
per year, an increase of 38 percent. Therefore, of
the 60 percent difference in outpatient drug expendi-
tures between those who have no supplemental cov-
erage and retirees who have employment-based sup-
plemental coverage, 38 percent is attributable to a
greater quantity of drugs purchased and 16 percent
is attributable to a higher price.23 Drug coverage
should increase both the quantity and the price of
prescriptions purchased, whereas physician coverage
should primarily affect the quantity of prescriptions
purchased.24
Previous RAND and CBO studies indicate that
most of the 60 percent difference should be attrib-
uted to increased physician coverage alone.25 At-
tributing only the price increase to drug coverage
implies a 16 percent increase in outpatient drug ex-
penditures for those who have no supplemental cov-
erage. On the basis of this calculation and the re-
sults of previous studies, if a prescription drug ben-
efit was added to Medicare, the most that prescrip-
21. The proposal would introduce coinsurance payments on lab ser-
vices.
22. Congressional Budget Office, "Behavioral Assumptions for Esti-
mating the Effects of Health Care Proposals."
23. If the quantity purchased rises by 38 percent on average, then the
price paid must rise by 16 percent on average to get a 60 percent
increase in expenditures.
24. Congressional Budget Office, Updated Estimates of Medicare's
Catastrophic Drug Insurance Program, pp. 47-50. These figures
were adjusted to account for differences in population characteris-
tics.
25. The RAND studies include Manning and others, "Health Insurance
and the Demand for Medical Care," and Leibowitz, Manning, and
Newhouse, "The Demand for Prescription Drugs as a Function of
Cost-Sharing."
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tion drug expenditures could increase for those who
have no supplemental coverage is assumed to be 15
percent. Consequently, a range of 7.5 percent to 15
percent is used to reflect the probable response of
this group, which now has no supplemental cover-
age.
Total Demand Would Increase. On the basis of
these estimates, if the proposed prescription drug
benefit were added to Medicare, the outpatient pre-
scription drug expenditures of all 65-and-over Medi-
care enrollees would increase by about 4 percent
(see Table 3). The amount that prescription drug
coverage is estimated to increase for each group dis-
cussed above is weighted by the group's share of
total prescription drug expenditures (by all 65-and-
over Medicare enrollees). This weight takes into
account the size of the group in relation to the en-
tire Medicare population as well as the average pre-
scription drug expenditures of each group.26 Most
of the increase in demand results from extending
drug coverage to those currently covered by medi-
gap plans and to the 11 percent of the elderly who
currently have no supplemental coverage at all.
One percent of the 65-and-over population has
no health insurance at all. Under the Administra-
tion's proposal, this group would be compelled to
buy into either Medicare's SMI program or a com-
prehensive plan offered by a health alliance. The
drug benefit that would be offered by Medicare is
almost identical to that offered under the high-cost-
sharing plan. Therefore, whether they get it through
Medicare or an alliance plan, those who are 65 and
over and uninsured will obtain coverage that in-
cludes a drug benefit. No survey numbers are avail-
able on which to base an induced demand estimate
for this group. The estimate is therefore based on
the 77 percent increase in expenditures projected for
the uninsured people under 65. It follows, then,
that if and when those who are not only 65 and
over but uninsured as well receive coverage for the
first time, the expenditures of all those 65 and over
on outpatient prescription drugs would increase by
no more than one-half of one percent.27
The Administration's proposal would increase
the outpatient prescription drug expenditures of 65-
and-over Medicare enrollees by about 4 percent. In
1990, 29.4 million U.S. residents 65 years old or
older were enrolled in the SMI program. The total
number of people in the United States 65 years old
or older was 31.1 million. Therefore, approximately
95 percent of the 65-and-over population is covered
by Medicare's SMI program.28 Taking into account
the small increase caused by extending drug cover-
age to the uninsured 65-and-over population, CBO
estimates that the increase in outpatient prescription
drug expenditures for all people 65 and over would
also be about 4 percent.
Approximately 3.6 million Medicare enrollees
are under age 65. They constitute less than 2 per-
cent of the under-65 population (see Table 1). Be-
cause they are such a small portion of the under-65
population, their increase in outpatient drug expen-
ditures under Medicare's new drug benefit would
not alter the estimated 5 percent to 7 percent in-
crease in prescription drug expenditures for the pop-
ulation that is under 65 years old.
Conclusions
CBO calculates that universal coverage as proposed
by the Administration could increase the under-65
population's demand for prescription drugs by ap-
proximately 5 percent to 7 percent. Because two-
thirds of all prescription drugs are purchased by
people under age 65, the resulting increase in de-
mand would cause total prescription drug expendi-
tures to rise by 3 percent to 5 percent. Most of the
increase in demand would result from extending
coverage to the 37 million uninsured (99 percent of
26. In constructing these weights, CBO assumes that the average
expenditures of those with "other" coverage and those with Medic-
aid but no drug benefit are the same as the average expenditures
of those with coverage through medigap, since these categories
did not exist in the 1987 NMES.
27. As in the case of the uninsured under-65 population, it is assumed
that this group's share in total drug expenditures is equal to just
under half of its share of the total population.
28. Health Care Financing Administration, Medicare and Medicaid
Statistical Supplement, pp. 14, 18-19, and Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1993.
28 HOW HEALTH CARE REFORM AFFECTS PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT June 1994
whom are under age 65). The rest would be caused
largely by those who have private insurance and
would receive better health insurance coverage un-
der the Administration's proposal.
Medicare's new drug benefit could increase the
demand of the 65-and-over population for outpatient
prescription drugs by about 4 percent. Since one-
third of all prescription drug expenditures are made
by people 65 and over, and 77 percent of prescrip-
tion drug expenditures are outpatient, this increased
demand would raise total prescription drug expen-
ditures by approximately 1 percent. Many Medicare
enrollees already have prescription drug coverage
through retirement plans. Much of this increase
would be caused by those who have only private
medigap coverage, which usually does not include
prescription drug insurance, and the 11 percent of
Medicare enrollees who have no supplemental cov-
erage at all.
Overall, CBO estimates that the universal cover-
age provision and the Medicare drug benefit pro-
posed by the Administration would increase total
prescription drug expenditures by approximately 4
percent to 6 percent.
Chapter Four
The Rebate on Medicare Prescription
Drugs and the Advisory Council
on Breakthrough Drugs
B ecause its proposal would give all legal resi-dents of the United States a pharmaceuticalbenefit that could create a windfall for the
industry, the Administration hopes to ensure that the
U.S. taxpayer would not be excessively penalized
for providing new benefits to Medicare beneficia-
ries. At the same time, the Administration has
reason to be skeptical of formal price controls.
Consequently, it has devised new mechanisms for
containing costs.
The Medicare Drug
Rebate Agreement
The proposal submitted by the Administration
would require that a pharmaceutical manufacturer
enter into a rebate agreement with the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (HHS) if a drug is to
be covered under Medicare's new drug benefit
provision. Modeled after the existing Medicaid
rebate, the proposal's agreement requires that phar-
maceutical manufacturers pay a rebate to the federal
government on all brand-name drugs purchased
through Medicare. Generic drugs are exempt.
price paid to pharmaceutical manufacturers for
drugs sold by pharmacies and other retailers.1 Man-
ufacturers usually charge institutional purchasers,
such as health maintenance organizations and hospi-
tals, a lower price than retail pharmacies charge for
the same drug. The rebate would be larger if the
difference between the average manufacturer retail
price and the average price paid by institutional
purchasers exceeds 17 percent. In that case, the
rebate would equal the average discount given to
institutional purchasers. Specifically, it would be
equal to the amount by which the average manu-
facturer retail price exceeds the "average manufac-
turer nonretail price" (defined as the discounted
price that institutional purchasers pay for the drug).2
This formula ensures that the government would
pay no more for a drug purchased through Medicare
than the average institutional purchaser. And the
government would pay less than institutional pur-
chasers when the average institutional discount is
less than 17 percent. Although the discounts given
to institutional purchasers can be partially justified
on the grounds that bulk purchases lower distribu-
tion costs, this would not be true for drugs bought
through Medicare.
Calculation of the Rebate
Under the Administration's proposal, the rebate
would be no less than 17 percent of the "average
manufacturer retail price," which is defined as the
1. Health Security Act (H.R. 3600 and S. 1757, 103rd Congress, 1st
Session, 1993), Title II, Subtitle A, Sec. 2003(f)d).
2. Health Security Act, Title II, Subtitle A, Sec. 2003(0(2). The
purchases of the Department of Defense and the Department of
Veterans Affairs are included in the calculation of the average
manufacturer nonretail price.
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The rebate might be increased further if the
average manufacturer retail price of a drug rose
faster than the consumer price index. (The Medic-
aid rebate has a similar provision.) The rebate
would be increased to offset any increase in the
price of the drug above the inflation rate.
The Administration's proposal also includes a
specific provision that requires the manufacturer to
charge the same price to all wholesalers, retailers,
and institutions that purchase drugs on the same
terms. These terms include "prompt payment, cash
payment, volume purchase, single-site delivery, the
use of formularies by purchasers and any other
terms effectively reducing the manufacturer's
costs."3 Many reasons therefore exist for differ-
ences in the terms of purchase. Buyers, such as re-
tail pharmacies, that do not use formularies (lists of
drugs that may be prescribed) could be charged a
different price, even for the same quantity of drugs,
than the institutional purchasers that do use them.
In addition, formularies differ in their restrictive-
ness, a disparity that may constitute a difference in
the terms of purchase. Apparently, this equal-pric-
ing provision may not prevent manufacturers from
granting greater discounts to hospitals and health
maintenance organizations than to retail pharmacies.
The proposed Medicare rebate agreement would
require that the pharmaceutical firms report to the
Secretary of HHS the amount of their average man-
ufacturer retail and nonretail prices on each drug
covered by Medicare. In addition, the Secretary
would be empowered to inspect the records of man-
ufacturers and survey wholesalers, pharmacies, and
institutional purchasers of drugs "as necessary" to
verify reported prices.4 Financial penalties of up to
$100,000 could be imposed on manufacturers who
refuse to comply.
The manufacturer could terminate the rebate
agreement with the Secretary at any time. In that
case, however, Medicare would not cover any of the
manufacturer's drugs. Manufacturers would not be
able to exclude some of their existing drugs from
the rebate agreement. All of a manufacturer's drugs
would be covered or none would be covered.
Drugs introduced after June 1993 would be an
exception. The Secretary may negotiate a higher
rebate than 17 percent on these drugs. If no agree-
ment can be reached between the Secretary and the
manufacturer on the rebate amount, that drug may
be excluded from coverage and the remainder of the
manufacturer's drugs would still be covered by
Medicare.
Problems with Reporting
In practice, isolating a price paid to the manufac-
turer for drugs sold at retail is difficult. Most retail-
ers, primarily pharmacies, buy drugs through a
wholesaler, but so do many institutional purchasers.
About three-quarters of all drugs are distributed
through independent wholesalers to both pharmacies
and such institutional purchasers as hospitals.
About 22 percent of the wholesalers' business con-
sists of sales to hospitals.5 It is therefore difficult to
calculate the average manufacturer retail price on
the basis of the price charged to wholesalers. This
calculation is currently done, however, for the Med-
icaid rebates, based on prices reported by the phar-
maceutical companies.
Under the Administration's proposal, the Secre-
tary would report to the manufacturer the quantities
of drugs purchased through Medicare on which a
rebate must be paid. Rebates are likely to be re-
quested on all drugs purchased by Medicare enroll-
ees, even those that fall under the $250 deductible
and are therefore not paid for by Medicare.6 Under-
reporting could be a problem for Medicare enrollees
whose drug purchases never exceed the $250 de-
ductible. Medicare enrollees who spend less than
$250 on drugs would have no incentive to report
these expenditures, and neither would the pharma-
3. Health Security Act, Title II, Subtitle A, Sec. 2003(e).
4. Ibid., Title II, Subtitle A, Sec. 2003(b)(3)(C).
5. Mickey Smith, Pharmaceutical Marketing, Strategy and Cases
(New York: Pharmaceutical Products Press, 1991), p. 50.
6. Health Security Act, Title II, Subtitle A, Sec. 2003(b)(l)(B).
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cist.7 According to Congressional Budget Office
calculations, the prescription drug expenditures of
the 65-and-over Medicare enrollees who spent just
$300 or less constituted 10 percent of total outpa-
tient prescription drug expenditures in 1987.8 For
this reason, somewhat less than 10 percent of drug
expenditures by Medicare enrollees could go unre-
ported. Therefore, no rebate would be paid on these
sales.
lower price.9 If a rebate could not be negotiated,
the Secretary could exclude the drug from reim-
bursement by Medicare. The company would have
six months after marketing approval by the Food
and Drug Administration to negotiate the rebate.
Because Medicare beneficiaries represent more than
one-third of the total pharmaceutical market, such a
refusal is widely viewed as hurting the chances of
commercial success of most drugs.
The Medicare Rebate
for New Drugs
An additional rationale for examining drug launch
prices is that in order to compensate themselves for
the proposed Medicare rebate and in anticipation of
not being able to raise prices later, pharmaceutical
companies might be tempted to launch new drugs at
high prices. The government would therefore want
some way of controlling this effect.
The Administration's proposal would affect the
prices of new drugs in two ways: through the Medi-
care rebate agreement and through the Advisory
Council on Breakthrough Drugs. The Administra-
tion's proposal includes special rules for negotiating
the Medicare rebate on new drugs. In addition, the
Advisory Council on Breakthrough Drugs would
examine the reasonableness of the prices of new
drugs that bring significant new therapeutic potential
to the marketplace.
For any drug that was first marketed after June
1993, Medicare could negotiate a special rebate if
the Secretary of HHS believes the drug is priced
excessively or finds that it is marketed abroad at a
7. Unless the pharmacist bills Medicare, which then bills the Medi-
care enrollee for the drug. The current Secretary of Health and
Human Services has granted a contract to GTE Government Sys-
tems Corp. to design a computerized billing system for Medicare;
the enrollee will need only to present a card to the doctor and
Medicare will bill the patient for what is not covered. Spencer
Rich, "Medicare Billing to Join Electronic Superhighway," The
Washington Post, January 20, 1994, p. A21. This system could be
applied to Pharmaceuticals, obviating the reporting problem.
8. Congressional Budget Office, Updated Estimates of Medicare's
Catastrophic Drug Insurance Program (October 1989).
Evaluating New Drug Prices
One aspect of this provision is that the Administra-
tion's proposal requires a determination of the po-
tential for a special rebate on all new drugs, with
the Advisory Council responsible only for break-
through drugs. The Administration's proposal, how-
ever, presents no institutional mechanism, other than
through the Secretary of HHS, by which the appro-
priateness of the prices of nonbreakthrough new
drugs, which constitute the vast majority of new
Pharmaceuticals, is to be determined. As a result,
the Secretary might have to expand the role of the
Advisory Council.
If the price of a drug in any one of almost two
dozen foreign (mostly European) countries specified
in the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FFDCA) were significantly below its U.S. versions'
average retail price, the Secretary could begin spe-
cial rebate negotiations on new drugs reimbursed
through Medicare.10 Since the prices of drugs
newly introduced into the United States are unlikely
to be lower than the prices in all of the FFDCA-
specified countries, all new drugs could be subject
to special rebate negotiations. The Administration's
proposal states that the new drug rebate can be no
greater than the difference between the wholesale
price in any one of the specified countries and the
average retail price of drugs manufactured in the
United States.
The proposal outlines various factors that the
Secretary would use to deliberate on and negotiate
with drug manufacturers, namely:
9. Health Security Act, Title II, Subtitle A, Sec. 2003(c).
10. Ibid., Title II, Subtitle A, Sec. 2003(c)(3)(A)(ii).
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Prices of other drugs in the same thera-
peutic class;
Manufacturer's cost information;
Factors affecting costs, such as projected
prescription volume, economies of scale,
product stability, and special manufactur-
ing requirements;
Foreign drug prices; and
Other relevant factors.
These criteria use guideposts that private actors
in the market typically use to set prices, but adapt
them to federal policy. If the criteria were applied
mechanically or punitively, they could substantially
reduce the return on new drugs (breakthrough or
otherwise) purchased frequently by Medicare en-
rollees. If applied with judgment, some analysts
argue, the criteria could protect the taxpayers' inter-
est without harming the drug companies. Until the
uncertainty concerning the ways in which they
would be applied becomes clear, however, these
provisions significantly increase the risk of develop-
ing new drugs.
The FDA has approved 90 nongeneric drugs a
year, or an average of one every four days, during
the last 20 years. Arriving at a clear judgment
about an appropriate price (and rebate) for each of
these may prove difficult. The very number of
decisions suggests that mechanical interpretations of
the law would be common.
Prices of Similar Drugs. Prices of other drugs in
the same therapeutic categories (the first criterion)
are certainly relevant in deciding how reasonably a
new drug is priced. New drugs under review often
offer benefits that other drugs in the category do
not. (In most instances, unless they do offer new
benefits, new drugs are priced at or below existing
drugs.) What are these additional benefits worth?
In some markets, great advances in performance are
sometimes not highly valued because current tech-
nology is "good enough." In other instances, even a
small improvement in therapy or convenience is
valuable to consumers.
Thus far, because insurance has often insulated
patients from the full costs of health care, or doctors
have made decisions for them, patients have not had
to make the types of cost-performance trade-offs
faced by consumers in other markets. Conse-
quently, it is exceptionally difficult to judge the
value of product improvements in the pharmaceuti-
cal market. There is little data on how consumers
really value new drugs. In the past, the concern
was relatively unimportant because most of the
evaluations by consumers were private. But under
the Administration's proposal, the Secretary would
represent the official position of the federal govern-
ment (and the willingness of taxpayers to pay) as to
the economic value of a particular drug in a given
therapeutic category.
In their efforts to control overall health (not just
drug) costs, doctors and other health providers have
begun to consider not only the purchase price of
medicines, but also their cost-effectiveness. The
whole concept of deciding the economic value of
pharmaceutical therapy (pharmacoeconomics) is
relatively new and many questions regarding meth-
odology and intangibles remain unanswered.11
Manufacturers' Costs. Most important, how
would research and development and other fixed
costs be accounted for in calculating the reasonable-
ness of the introductory price? Although the
Administration's proposal does not mention R&D
and other fixed costs specifically, these factors dom-
inate average drug costs.
Each commercially successful product must pay
for its own R&D and for the R&D of products that
fail technically and commercially. Obviously, not
every successful product carries all of the costs of
the unsuccessful ones. How would the Secretary
determine what share of a firm's total R&D each
product should be expected to pay? Using industry
averages as guideposts makes it difficult to set
individual prices because there are such wide devia-
11. William McGhan, "Pharmacoeconomics and the Evaluation of
Drugs and Services," Hospital Formulary (April 1993), pp. 365-
378; Stephen Coons and Robert Kaplan, "Quality-of-Life Assess-
ment: Understanding Its Use as an Outcome Measure," Hospital
Formulary (May 1993), pp. 486-498; and Tracy Skaer, "Applying
Pharmacoeconomics and Quality-of-Life Measure to the Formulary
Management Process," Hospital Formulary (June 1993), pp. 577-
584.
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tions among the industry averages. Pharmaceutical
companies try to recover as much as possible
through their successes, but are limited by market
forces. Like the previous criterion—prices of similar
drugs—this one uses guideposts that private actors in
the market typically use independently of each other
and turns them into federal policy for the entire
market.
Factors Affecting Costs. The Secretary would ob-
tain data on, or estimate, economies of scale, the
expected size of the market, special manufacturing
requirements, and product stability in order to deter-
mine the reasonableness of a drug's launch price.
In some sense, the Secretary would be seeking data
similar to that sought by public utility regulatory
commissions when they set electrical or telephone
rates. As with a regulatory commission, price levels
could be set with relative ease, given some target
rate of return.
There are substantial differences, however,
between the pharmaceutical and utilities industries.
The sales of a utility probably vary much less than
those of a new drug. Utilities rarely sell a new
product, while drug companies do so all the time.
Forecasting the market size of any new product is
notoriously difficult. Medicare officials could not
be expected to know whether the drug companies
should amortize the R&D and other fixed costs over
10 million pills or 100 million pills. Consequently,
when the Secretary calculates the rate of return, he
or she would be doing so with much poorer infor-
mation than that available to a typical regulatory
agency.
Foreign Drug Prices. Foreign prices, though often
useful as a starting point for analysis, can be mis-
leading if they are not put into an appropriate insti-
tutional context. For example, until 1993 Canada
licensed drugs on a compulsory basis.12 Companies
had to allow other manufacturers to make and sell
their drugs before the patent ran out. The result
was competition among firms producing the same
brand-name drugs and charging lower prices than in
the United States.13 Since the Canadian market is
small, U.S. pharmaceutical companies have been
willing to enter that market and license their prod-
ucts; they may not make large profits in Canada,
but they can spread their fixed R&D costs further.
Another question facing federal authorities is
how to determine which of the foreign prices are
reliable indicators of recovery costs. Some prices
are determined by foreign health authorities acting
as buyers on behalf of their citizenry, using their
market power equally against both domestic and
foreign pharmaceutical makers. By contrast, other
countries that would be used for comparison do not
have a domestic pharmaceutical industry that per-
forms world-class R&D and may be willing to ne-
gotiate low prices. Using the wrong set of foreign
prices might result in prices fixed below the level of
R&D cost recovery.
In other instances, exchange rate fluctuations
could quickly drive a wedge between U.S. and some
foreign prices, even if launch prices were similar.
This could occur especially when a country was
experiencing a drop in the value of its currency.
This criterion might also provide pharmaceutical
companies with incentives to introduce their drugs
first in high-price countries, so as to have only high
foreign prices for purposes of domestic comparison.
Such actions could reduce the availability of new
drugs in countries with histories of low prices.
Some economists argue that for industries in
which many costs are large and fixed, such as the
airline or pharmaceutical industries, those consumers
who are most willing to pay should bear those
costs. In the airline industry, it is the business
traveler who bears these fixed costs. Thus, if U.S.
consumers are most willing to pay for new medical
technology, they should bear a disproportionate
share of the costs. Under these circumstances,
international comparisons of prices would be mis-
leading, especially when some U.S. customers pay a
lower price because they have joined a health plan
that manages the pharmacy benefit. Since the pro-
posal uses average retail price, international com-
12. The debate over mandatory licensing of patents is much broader
than drug pricing and will not be dealt with here.
13. General Accounting Office, Prescription Drugs: Companies Typi-
cally Charge More in the United States Than in Canada (Septem-
ber 1992).
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parisons would overlook all those U.S. customers
who are buying their drugs through such cost-saving
plans. In this context, international comparisons
would be between the least cost-sensitive U.S. con-
sumer and the average foreign consumer.
Other Relevant Factors. The proposal's last set of
criteria, designated as "other relevant factors," is
undefined. But the Advisory Council's list of eval-
uative criteria does contain two additional entries
that may serve as guidelines. These concern the
cost-effectiveness of new drugs and their effects on
the quality of life.
The Advisory Council on
Breakthrough Drugs
Under the Administration's proposal, when the FDA
approves any new drug representing a significant
therapeutic advance (or breakthrough), the launch
price would be subject to review by an Advisory
Council on Breakthrough Drugs.14 The Advisory
Council's findings, unlike the Medicare rebate nego-
tiations, would be public and thus could have influ-
ence beyond the federal market. As the name im-
plies, the Advisory Council has no direct legal pow-
er, but affects prices only through other economic
actors-Medicare and other health plans-should they
choose to listen to the council's opinion. Of course,
the Advisory Council might help form public opin-
ion, which has been quite powerful on occasion, but
which is difficult to model or predict.
The 13 members of the Advisory Council, who
would be appointed by the Secretary of HHS, would
be responsible for determining whether or not the
launch price of a breakthrough drug was "reason-
able." The Secretary of HHS would publish the
council's determination, together with minority
opinions, in the Federal Register.
Depending on how the proposed legislation is
interpreted, the Advisory Council might play a role
in only a very small number of drug introductions.
Although the Administration's proposal does not
Figure 8.
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by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
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a. In 1979, the FDA approved no breakthrough drugs.
define the term "significant advance over existing
therapies," the FDA has used this classification for
years and only recently switched to a new method
of grouping. Between 1975 and 1991, the FDA
approved an average of 22 new drugs (new active
ingredients, which the FDA calls new molecular
entities) each year (see Figure 8).15 The break-
through category, promising major new therapeutic
potential, accounts for one-seventh of all new
molecular entities, or about three drugs each year.
(Including those new molecular entities that have
only modest therapeutic potential would increase the
14. Health Security Act, Title I, Subtitle F, Sec. 1572.
15. A new molecular entity is an active ingredient that has never been
marketed before in this country. Other categories of FDA ap-
proval include derivatives of existing active ingredients and new
formulations, combinations, uses, or manufacturers. These other
categories could easily become commercially important without
receiving regulatory priority. In total, the FDA averaged about 90
approvals a year for nongeneric drugs during the 1975-1991
period. For a description of FDA classification of drug approval
applications, see Food and Drug Administration, FDA Consumer
Special Report; From Test Tube to Patient: New Drug Develop-
ment in the United States (January 1988), p. 30. All of these
numbers exclude so-called biological preparations, such as blood
products, which are handled differently by FDA and constitute
about 5 percent of pharmaceutical sales.
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total to about 11 drugs a year.) Thus, the Advisory
Council could only consider a handful of cases each
year if it were working on breakthrough drugs
alone.
By contrast, if the proposal is interpreted to
include new uses of existing drugs and other
modifications of potential commercial (or medical)
importance, the Advisory Council might play a
more central role. The FDA's therapeutic classifica-
tion system does not correspond to eventual com-
mercial importance. (For example, Zantac, the
world's best-selling drug, was not classified as a
breakthrough drug by the FDA.) The classification
system serves only to allocate FDA resources.
Whether this system would be appropriate for an-
other purpose is open to question.
Although very few drugs can be classified as
breakthroughs, many companies undertake R&D
fully intending to develop such a drug. Thus, even
if the actual number of drugs directly involved is
small, the effects on pharmaceutical companies can
be much greater, especially because each company
depends on a small number of drugs for a dispro-
portionate share of its sales.
The Administration's proposal directs the Advi-
sory Council to use many of the same evaluative
criteria as the Secretary of HHS, although the Advi-
sory Council would also explicitly consider research
costs, which are not specifically included in the
Medicare criteria. Many of the same observations
about these criteria apply to the Advisory Council's
findings. In addition, the Administration's proposal
includes two other important evaluative standards:
o Cost-effectiveness, in relation to other pharma-
ceutical and nonpharmaceutical treatment; and
o Improvements in the quality of life, including
the ability to work and live a normal existence.
Obviously, these additional criteria make the
deliberations of the Advisory Council much more
complete than those prescribed by the Administra-
tion's proposal for the Medicare rebate. But even
these broader principles present problems. A new
drug may be cost-effective in relation to its pharma-
ceutical predecessors and surgical alternatives, but
still be more expensive than necessary to reward the
investors and company for their expenses and risk.16
Given the higher-than-normal profits for the indus-
try, many breakthrough drugs may be in this posi-
tion.
The Advisory Council might duplicate some of
the work of the Agency for Health Care Policy and
Research within the Public Health Service. The
agency's missions encompass evaluating and report-
ing on the effects of new health care technology,
including pharmaceutical therapy, with respect to
health care costs, productivity, and market forces.
(It also reports on safety, appropriateness, and effi-
cacy, but that is less relevant here.) One division
has a staff of more than 150 working in the area of
health care costs, quality, and access. Another divi-
sion focuses on outpatient pharmaceutical projects,
including cost containment mechanisms. In addi-
tion, the agency regards the broadest dissemination
of its research as part of its mission. In fiscal year
1994, the Congress appropriated $135 million for
the agency. This organization might expand sub-
stantially under the Administration's proposal.
Unlike the Medicare rebate, which would exist
ostensibly to protect the taxpayer, the Advisory
Council would be created to judge prices for the
public as a whole. It would not be the first time
that the federal government has tried to determine
the reasonableness of prices. In general, however,
federal agencies have found it extremely difficult to
determine what a reasonable price is, especially in a
dynamic market like pharmaceuticals. The Supreme
Court expressly disavowed imposing a "reasonable-
ness" test in price-fixing cases because it was so
difficult to determine and changed constantly.17
What was "reasonable" in one year might not be a
year later. In other areas, even those in which price
regulation continues, federal and state regulators are
moving toward mechanisms that would permit the
market to have more influence in determining final
prices.
16. Statement of Judith Wagner, Office of Technology Assessment,
before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, November 16,
1993.
17. F. M. Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and
Economic Performance, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Com-
pany, 1990), p. 336.
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Effects on the
Pharmaceutical Market
sales (or some other financial target), rather than
profits, could be in this position and might be able
to increase their profits in the non-Medicare market
by raising prices.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers may attempt to raise
prices in order to compensate for the proposed 17
percent rebate. In general, a manufacturer cannot
charge the Medicare and non-Medicare populations
different prices for the same drugs because most
drugs are distributed through wholesalers and other
intermediaries. Therefore, a manufacturer would
have to try raising prices for all users of a drug.
Typically, economists assume that the costs of
government actions, like the rebate, are shared by
consumers and producers according to their relative
sensitivities to changes in price. In this instance,
however, not all sales of a drug would be subject to
the rebate. Instead, only the purchases by Medicare
beneficiaries would be affected. The purchases and
profits of the drug companies for their sales to non-
Medicare patients would not be affected.
Companies that raise the prices of their product
typically lose market share. If the drug companies
are already charging the prices that give them the
highest profits, they cannot fully offset the rebate by
raising prices.
The provision in the Administration's proposal
that grants the Secretary of HHS the power to raise
the Medicare rebate if the price of a drug rises
faster than inflation is intended to make it more
difficult for drug companies to raise prices to com-
pensate for the rebate. The additional rebate could
largely offset the benefits to the company from rais-
ing prices. The added rebate may prevent a drug
company from raising its prices because the increase
in the rebate would deprive it of additional revenues
from Medicare sales. In addition, the higher price
could decrease its share of the Medicare market. A
price increase might also reduce market share (and
possibly profit) for its non-Medicare sales.
If drug companies are not currently charging
prices that guarantee them the highest profit, they
might be able to circumvent at least part of the
rebate through price increases. Firms that price
their product to guarantee the maximum level of
Effects on the Role of Government
in the Pharmaceutical Market
As a result of Medicare's actions, sometimes in
conjunction with the Advisory Council, the federal
government might have substantial influence on the
prices of many Pharmaceuticals. Medicare would
set the initial rebate based on the "reasonableness"
of the launch price. After the launch period, the
Medicare rebate would rise if a pharmaceutical
company increased its prices above the rate of infla-
tion. Consequently, the federal government would
be sending strong signals to drug manufacturers
about launch price and subsequent price increases.
But the use of these policy mechanisms would
oppose a 15-year trend in government policy toward
regulated industries, which has been to eliminate
price and quantity regulations while retaining qual-
ity and safety standards.18
Seen from another perspective, the Medicare
rebates do not constitute price controls but serve the
public purpose of limiting taxpayer costs. Before
the 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act estab-
lished the Medicaid rebate and other cost contain-
ment provisions, Medicaid was paying some of the
highest prices on the market. Without similar con-
trols, some fear that Medicare could incur substan-
tial costs. Furthermore, under the Administration's
proposal, the Secretary of HHS must set the price
that the federal government is willing to pay for
new products, just as the operator of any other
health plan does. Supporters of the proposal argue
that the special rebate for new drugs, though imper-
fect, is adequate to ensure that the taxpayer is pro-
tected. The rebate agreement in no way legally
limits prices charged to non-Medicare patients.
18. In 1977, 17 percent of U.S. gross national product was produced
by regulated industries. By 1988, the regulated industries' share
of GNP had been cut to 6.6 percent. Clifford Winston, "Eco-
nomic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists,"
Journal of Economic Literature (September 1993), pp. 1263-1289.
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Furthermore, findings of the Advisory Council are
not legally binding on any organization.
Effects on Discounts to
Institutional Buyers
As a result of the proposal's rebate agreement, insti-
tutional purchasers could pay a higher price for
drugs. Based on interviews with representatives of
drug companies, the Boston Consulting Group esti-
mates that discounts given to institutional purchasers
in 1992 averaged 16 percent less than list price.19
Wholesalers commonly receive a discount from the
list price. Therefore, the discount from the "average
manufacturer retail price" would be lower.
The Medicaid rebate on a drug exceeds 15.7
percent if the best discount given to an institutional
purchaser of the drug exceeds this amount. Based
on a sample of 100 patented drugs for which the
Medicaid program currently spends the most money,
the Congressional Budget Office found that the
median best discount given to institutional purchas-
ers was 18 percent off the average manufacturer's
price (approximately the price paid by wholesalers
and the Medicaid rebate equivalent of the "average
manufacturer retail price"). Since the average dis-
count given to institutional purchasers would be
lower than the best discount given to any institu-
tional purchaser, the amount that brand-name drugs
are discounted for institutional purchasers may often
average below 17 percent.
Discounts for institutional purchasers are cur-
rently smaller than they might be without the Med-
icaid rebates. The incentive to give institutional
purchasers discounts of more than 17 percent on
drugs purchased by Medicare beneficiaries would
diminish, but perhaps no more than it has already
diminished under the Medicaid rebate agreement. If
the amount of the drug consumed by Medicare ben-
eficiaries is large enough in relation to the total de-
mand for the drug, the manufacturer is likely to
keep its average discount rate to institutional pur-
chasers at or below 17 percent.
19. Boston Consulting Group, The Changing Environment for U.S.
Pharmaceuticals (New York: Boston Consulting Group, April
1993), p. 10.
Effects on Launch Prices
Part of the Medicare rebate could be recovered by
setting a higher launch price. Since market share
declines when price increases, it may not be possi-
ble for pharmaceutical firms to recover the rebate
fully by raising prices. If manufacturers do not
raise launch prices, they would be able to recoup
part of the revenues lost to the rebate only by low-
ering negotiated discounts to institutional pur-
chasers.
Drug manufactures could raise their launch
prices and not necessarily incur a special rebate.
The average new drug is currently launched at 14
percent below the price of the market leader. Phar-
maceutical companies know that they would not be
allowed to raise prices beyond the increase in the
consumer price index without incurring an addi-
tional Medicare rebate. This knowledge would
encourage them to increase their introductory prices
on new drugs. Thus, instead of launching new
drugs at an average of 14 percent below the market
leader, pharmaceutical companies could introduce
them at, say, 7 percent under the market leader.
(Given the uncertainty surrounding all aspects of
marketing a new drug, there may be a great deal of
play in the current launch price.) Since the new
drug prices would be less than the prices of existing
drugs in the therapeutic category, pharmaceutical
companies might not have an additional Medicare
rebate beyond the 17 percent. But prices would be
higher than they otherwise would have been. Fur-
thermore, if launch prices are higher, the position of
the market leader may be strengthened and the role
of the imitator in restraining prices may be reduced.
Effects on Competition
Some aspects of the drug market challenge popular
notions about the ability of producers to keep prices
high and the role of high prices in encouraging
competition. As noted previously, generic drugs are
not the only source of competition. Imitative brand-
name drugs also play a role in bringing down
prices, often before the patent expires. If the Medi-
care rebate on imitative drugs is set too high, the
effect could be to discourage early entry and com-
petition. If the rebate is extended to generic drugs,
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as the Medicaid rebate currently is, competition in
the industry would be discouraged even more.20
Effects would not be felt immediately because drug
companies are likely to finish projects that are al-
ready nearing completion.
Effects on Biotechnology
Many biotechnology products would be subject to
the rebate. An informal count of two dozen ap-
proved biotechnology products found that two-thirds
could be used on an outpatient basis, either exclu-
sively or in addition to inpatient use. Others are
exclusively used on an inpatient basis and so would
not be subject to the rebate. Several hundred bio-
technology products now await approval or are in
clinical trials. CBO has no breakdown of their in-
patient or outpatient status. If a product is an out-
patient drug and subject to the rebate, the discussion
above regarding Medicare rebates would apply to it.
Limits on the Ability of the
Government to Hold Down Prices
The federal government has tried often in the past
to restrain price growth, usually with mixed results.
A limited bureaucracy cannot successfully keep
track of and control the modern market. Prices in
the drug market are also very complicated; they
vary in many dimensions (dosage, form, and pack-
aging, to name only three), any one of which could
be used to mask a price increase.
Given the hundreds of drugs and manufacturers
and the thousands of dosage and packaging forms in
the market, the federal agencies in charge of moni-
toring drug prices would have to rely on the compli-
ance of the drug companies, as they largely do now
for the Medicaid rebate.
The Secretary of HHS may also operate under
substantial political constraints. New drugs are
20. For an analysis of the effects of the current Medicaid rebates, see
Institute for Pharmaceutical Economics, The Impact of Medicaid
Rebates on Gross Margins of Generic Pharmaceuticals (Philadel-
phia: Philadelphia College of Pharmacy and Science, July 1992).
typically introduced at prices higher than existing
drugs only when the new drugs offer some thera-
peutic advance. Once a drug is on the market for
six months—during negotiations—and has established
itself as a treatment, it would be difficult for the
Secretary to eliminate Medicare reimbursement and
force patients to pay more or do without, especially
if the drug in question does provide expanded thera-
peutic benefit. Without the threat of removing
Medicare reimbursement, however, the government
would have no leverage in negotiations.
The Cost Containment
Provisions in Perspective
The cost containment provisions of the Administra-
tion's proposal might be useful in reducing taxpayer
costs for the new benefits in Medicare, but they
would add administrative complexity, could have
substantial side effects, and might not reduce overall
pharmaceutical costs.
Spending on pharmaceuticals can be contained
by slowing the growth of prices or quantities or
both. The Administration's proposal focuses largely
on containing costs on the price side. But part of
the extraordinary increases in drug prices that have
been reported over the last few years may be a sta-
tistical illusion, a result of the way drug prices are
sampled and the price index is computed (see Box 1
in Chapter 2). Economists who have tried to correct
the government price indexes for these effects have
found that increases in brand-name drug prices,
though above general inflation, were less than offi-
cial price measures indicated. Most important, ge-
neric drugs, which in unit terms represent a large
and increasing share of the prescription market,
have experienced virtually no price increases and
might actually be lowering average drug prices.
If price increases in pharmaceuticals have not
been as large as reported, the need for cost control
mechanisms may be less than previously thought.
Still, there may be a few drugs every year that pro-
vide unique capabilities but are very expensive.
And guaranteeing access to pharmaceuticals as part
of every resident's basic health coverage merits con-
cern over costs. Given the political constraints,
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however, the proposed cost containment mech-
anisms might not be very effective at rolling back
such prices.
The drugs that could force Medicare and other
health plans to incur heavy expenses are those that
are taken regularly, perhaps daily, by large numbers
of people, but their price might not be high in abso-
lute terms. It is difficult to determine in advance
which new drugs—including those now in clinical
trials—have the potential to impose higher costs on
Medicare and other plans. If used by enough peo-
ple, even a drug that has a reasonable launch price
could be very expensive.
The increasing competition in the pharmaceuti-
cal market may also reduce taxpayer costs. Seventy
percent of all prescriptions are written for drugs that
are made by more than one company, and the per-
centage is expected to rise. The Administration's
proposal includes some market-oriented steps: for
example, the drug benefit in Medicare would in-
crease competition by encouraging the use of gen-
eric drugs. Other fee-for-service benefit plans are
already going beyond such measures by using tech-
niques that involve increasing competition, such as
employing companies that manage pharmacy bene-
fits.

Chapter Five
Effects of Other Provisions
I n addition to universal coverage, the Medicarebenefit, and the Advisory Council on Break-through Drugs, three other aspects of the
Administration's proposal would affect the pharma-
ceutical market directly:
o Restructuring the Medicaid program and ending
the rebate on Medicaid prescription drugs;
o Shifting more people to managed health care;
and
o Limiting the rate of growth of health insurance
premiums.
Changes in Medicaid
Under the Administration's proposal, the rebates
that pharmaceutical companies now pay to the gov-
ernment on all drugs purchased through Medicaid
would be repealed. Medicaid provides health cover-
age for some people who have very low incomes.
Under the Administration's proposal, direct Medic-
aid pharmaceutical benefits would be replaced with
subsidies of the premiums for low-income people
who obtained coverage through regional health alli-
ances. Medicaid currently provides a generous
package of health benefits. All states provide drug
coverage but the generosity of the benefit varies.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers would no longer have
to pay the government a rebate on drugs purchased
by those people who were formerly covered through
Medicaid.
According to a recent Office of Technology
Assessment report, Medicaid covers 10 percent to
15 percent of all outpatient pharmaceutical expendi-
tures.1 The Medicaid rebates are equal to 15.7
percent of the average manufacturer's price or to the
best discount given by the manufacturer to an insti-
tutional purchaser, whichever is greater. The Med-
icaid rebates also increase if a drug's price rises
faster than the inflation rate. The Congressional
Budget Office found that 25 percent of the Medic-
aid rebate revenues in 1991 were paid on drugs for
which the best discount exceeded 15.7 percent. If
the Medicaid rebates were repealed, average unit
revenues of the pharmaceutical manufacturers could
increase by at least 2 percent (10 percent to 15
percent of 15.7 percent). This estimate does not
account for the instances in which the Medicaid
discount exceeds 15.7 percent; the estimate may
understate the rise in unit revenues for this reason.
However, if some of those who are now covered by
Medicaid move into plans that manage their drug
benefit (and therefore negotiate price discounts for
drugs with pharmaceutical firms), the estimate could
overstate the rise in average unit revenues. CBO
assumes that these two effects offset each other and
estimates that unit revenues on outpatient drugs
would rise by 2 percent if the Medicaid rebates
were repealed.
Shifting Patients to Managed
Care Providers
A managed care plan, such as a health maintenance
organization, may tend to use drugs more inten-
sively than fee-for-service providers. If people
switch to managed care providers in large numbers
and if such providers continue to use pharmaceuti-
cals as they have in the past, the market for drugs
Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs,
Risks and Rewards (February 1993), p. 245.
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could expand. CBO has not estimated how many
people would switch from fee-for-service to man-
aged care providers as a result of the Administra-
tion's proposal.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that managed care
providers use more Pharmaceuticals than the aver-
age fee-for-service provider, even when demo-
graphic and other differences between the enrollees
are taken into consideration. Managed care provid-
ers, such as group or staff health maintenance orga-
nizations, which are at financial risk for the costs of
their patients' care, have a strong economic incen-
tive to provide cost-effective treatments.
Because the number of managed care providers
has recently grown rapidly, there is little literature
dealing with their prescribing behavior. Neverthe-
less, one limited study has provided evidence con-
sistent with the anecdotal observations.2 This study
of one fee-for-service plan of a major corporation,
which included a prescription benefit, and seven
health maintenance organizations, which also in-
cluded prescription benefits, revealed several differ-
ences in the behavior of the two types of plan to-
ward Pharmaceuticals, namely:
o The health maintenance organizations prescribed
more drugs, even when differences in age pro-
file were adjusted for.3
o Health maintenance organizations used more
generic drugs.
o The total cost of prescription drugs—both to the
plan and patient—was lower in health mainte-
nance organizations than in fee-for-service
groups because generic drugs were used more
often. The health maintenance organizations'
total prescription costs were about 9 percent less
than the total prescription costs for fee-for-ser-
vice groups for patients under 65.
2. Jonathan P. Weiner and others, "Impact of Managed Care on
Prescription Drug Use," Health Affairs (Spring 1991), pp. 140-
154.
3. Despite attempts to control for differences in population, substan-
tial selection biases might occur in the two types of health plan.
o Health maintenance organizations began using
new Pharmaceuticals as rapidly as the fee-for-
service providers. They reduced costs by sub-
stituting generics where possible, not by deny-
ing access to new drugs.
But these findings may have to be tempered
because the fee-for-service plan may not have had
typical benefits. In their review of the benefits, the
authors did not mention a deductible, which most
health plans have, although they did refer to a co-
payment, which most plans also have. The lack of
a deductible might have increased pharmaceutical
demand. Thus, the fact that these particular health
maintenance organizations had a lower spending
rate than this particular fee-for-service plan may
have been caused by both factors and was not sim-
ply a result of managed pharmaceutical benefits.
The study suggests that the number of prescrip-
tions would rise as more persons moved to managed
care and that the primary beneficiaries of the in-
crease would be manufacturers of generic drugs.
Manufacturers of brand-name pharmaceuticals might
benefit if they had a generic line of drugs, but their
nongeneric lines might suffer. In fact, brand-name
drug firms own many of the major generic drug
companies, which produce the majority of generic
drugs prescribed in this country.
Prescription drug use, however, is not the whole
story. Health maintenance organizations also have
lower rates of hospitalization than do fee-for-service
plans. Since hospitals use a major quantity of phar-
maceuticals, the lower rate of hospitalization experi-
enced by health maintenance organizations might
almost offset their greater use of outpatient prescrip-
tion drugs. (These offsetting factors also serve to
illustrate the uncertainty surrounding the demand
estimates presented in the previous chapters.)
As managed care providers begin to occupy a
larger fraction of the market, fee-for-service provid-
ers may have to change their prescribing patterns.
Already the major health insurance plans encourage
their members to join a preferred provider organiza-
tion, a form that uses some of the control mecha-
nisms currently found in health maintenance organi-
zations. And many of the indemnity health plans
have managed drug benefits.
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Constraining the Rate
of Growth of Health
Plan Premiums
The Administration's proposal would set up a Na-
tional Health Board, which would, among its other
duties, establish an initial target per capita premium
for the standard benefit package in each regional
health alliance.4 The board would also limit the
growth of the premiums. The weighted average
premium would be constrained to meet the target.
Each alliance would have a different target. CBO
has made no explicit estimate of the effect of this
provision on the pharmaceutical market.
Restraining the rate of growth of premiums
would probably shift medical practice toward less
expensive treatments, possibly including greater use
of Pharmaceuticals.5 If a plan is limited in the
growth of the premium that can be charged per per-
son, the plan's sponsors would have every incentive
to reduce the costs of treatment, which often means
using drugs to substitute for more expensive forms
4. For corporations that had opted out of the regional alliance sys-
tem, the board would only control the rate of growth. Similarly,
the board would also set per capita premium targets for states that
set up alternatives to the alliance system. For a fuller discussion
of the proposed National Health Board and the regional alliances,
see Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Administra-
tion's Health Proposal (February 1994), pp. 22-24.
of medical treatment. The managed health care ex-
ample, discussed in the previous section, seems to
point in this direction. Plans and providers would
be unlikely to do so in excess, however, because of
the development of practice guidelines.
Under the Administration's proposal, if the
weighted average premium in a regional alliance
was above the target, the National Health Board
could require plans with excessive premiums (ac-
cording to criteria specified in the proposal) to
lower their premiums and their payments to provid-
ers.6 The language is not clear about what would
happen to payments for prescription benefits, al-
though they have not been explicitly exempted from
such cuts. Since pharmaceutical companies would
not be considered "participating providers," the
health plans would presumably not be able to re-
duce their incomes directly. The amount that the
plan paid per prescription might be lowered for
plans in which enrollees obtained their drugs from
retail pharmacists. Plans that have their own phar-
macies or managed drug benefits might try contract-
ing with drug wholesalers in the same way that they
would with participating providers; the contract
could specify that if the plan's premium were forced
down, wholesalers would have to accept a propor-
tional reduction. Retailers and wholesalers, how-
ever, would in all likelihood attempt to pass back
any reductions in income to pharmaceutical manu-
facturers.
5. Ibid., pp. 74-76. 6. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

Chapter Six
The Effect of the Administration's
Proposal on the Returns from
Drug Development
W hen a firm considers investing in thedevelopment of new drugs, it weighs thecosts it expects to incur in the research
and approval process against the profits that the
drugs are likely to generate throughout their time on
the market. If the ventures are successful, the costs
incurred in drug discovery and development are ex-
ceeded by the profits generated by those drugs that
reach the market. If the changes proposed by the
Administration increase the returns from developing
new drugs, one would expect firms to invest more
in drug development.
The Administration's proposal contains a uni-
versal entitlement to a standard benefit package that
includes coverage for prescription drugs.1 If en-
acted, this universal coverage provision, together
with the changes in Medicare that the Administra-
tion proposes, would probably affect the average
returns from drug development positively, but only
slightly, when the average is taken of all types of
drugs. The proposed changes would increase the
returns on drugs that are marketed primarily to the
under-65 population and decrease the returns on
drugs that are marketed primarily to those who are
65 and over. When averaged over all drugs, the
increase in returns is so small that it would probably
not significantly affect the level of research and
development undertaken in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry.
What Previous Studies of
the Returns from Drug
Development Show
Two studies—by the Office of Technology Assess-
ment and economists Henry Grabowski and John
Vernon-have compared the returns from developing
a new drug with the costs for drugs that were intro-
duced in the United States in the early 1980s.2
Both studies found that the profits generated by a
new drug are generally more than sufficient to com-
pensate for the cost of development, including the
cost of capital. But the amount by which returns
from developing a new drug exceed costs are mod-
est, on average, and would be eliminated if the
average price received for drugs sold worldwide
were just 4.3 percent lower.
Both studies estimate that the average after-tax
cost of developing a new drug, including the cost of
capital, is about $190 million in 1990 dollars (see
Table 4).3 These cost estimates are based on a large
CBO's estimate of induced demand results from the combination
of a universal entitlement and a generous benefit package (offering
both comprehensive physician and drug coverage). For the sake
of brevity, this combination will be referred to as the universal
coverage provision of the Administration's proposal.
Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs,
Risks and Rewards (February 1993); Henry Grabowski and John
Vernon, "Returns to R&D on New Drug Introductions in the
1980s" (paper presented at the American Enterprise Institute Con-
ference on Competitive Strategies in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
Washington D.C., October 27-28, 1993).
Since research and development is treated for tax purposes as a
current expense, spending $1 more on R&D costs a company just
65 cents when the marginal tax rate is 35 percent. Before ac-
counting for this tax savings, Grabowski and Vernon estimated
that it costs an average of $280 million to develop a new drug.
46 HOW HEALTH CARE REFORM AFFECTS PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT June 1994
Table 4.
The Cost of Drug Development Compared
with Profits for the Average Drug
(In millions of 1990 dollars)
Estimates
Office of
Grabowski Technology
and Vemon Assessment
Average Profits (Returns)8 210 230
Average Research
and Development Costsb 188 194
Excess Profits0 22 36
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Office of
Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D:
Costs, Risks and Rewards, (February 1993), and
Henry Grabowski and John Vernon, "Returns to R&D
on New Drug Introductions in the 1980s" (paper
presented at the American Enterprise Institute Con-
ference on Competitive Strategies in the Pharmaceu-
tical Industry, Washington, D.C., October 27-28,
1993).
a. Present value of the profits generated from sales of the aver-
age drug over its product life.
b. Includes the cost of capital.
c. Equals average profits minus average research and develop-
ment costs.
sample of drugs developed in the 1970s and mar-
keted in the 1980s. They include investment in re-
search and clinical tests to obtain Food and Drug
Administration approval as well as the cost of fail-
ures—that is, investment in research for drugs that
never made it to market.4 The cost of capital alone
constitutes approximately half of drug development
costs (see Appendix A).
Returns from drug development consist of the
present value of sales revenues less production, mar-
keting, and administrative costs. The Office of
Technology Assessment estimated that the present
value of these profits would average $230 million;
Grabowski and Vernon's estimate is lower: $210
million.
Both studies found that the returns from devel-
oping a new drug exceed the costs. Grabowski and
Vernon calculated that the returns from developing
a new drug exceed the costs by an average of $22
million; OTA found that the returns exceed costs by
an average of $36 million in 1990 dollars (see Table
4). Although these estimates are relatively close,
the assumptions made in each study differ in several
important respects.5 On average, developing a new
drug yields returns greater than the amount required
to compensate investors for their cost of capital.
The excess profits, however, are modest. OTA
found that they would disappear if prices fell by an
average of just 4.3 percent worldwide (and the
quantity sold did not change).6 U.S. sales constitute
at most one-half of the worldwide sales of drugs
patented in the United States. Thus, a decline of at
least 8.6 percent in the average price of prescription
drugs in the United States would be necessary to
eliminate these excess returns if prices elsewhere
did not change.
Such estimates of excess returns are very sensi-
tive to the cost of capital used to discount revenues
and capitalize costs.7 Increasing the cost of capital
lowers the present value of returns and increases the
present value of costs. Grabowski and Vernon point
out that excess returns would be eliminated in both
studies if the cost of capital were 1 percentage point
higher. By the same token, excess profits would be
higher-perhaps doubled-if the cost of capital were
1 percentage point lower.
4. Both studies base their cost estimates on the work of Joseph
DiMasi and others, "Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical
Industry," Journal of Health Economics, vol. 10 (1991).
5. The cost of capital used in OTA's calculation of the cost of drug
development is higher than that used by Grabowski. OTA uses a
lower cost of capital than Grabowski in discounting profits. The
differences offset each other. Grabowski also uses a higher cost
for plant and machinery than does OTA.
6. Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D, pp. 89-
90.
7. Both studies based their cost of capital on an OTA-commissioned
study that found the real cost of capital for this industry to be
between 10 percent and 11 percent. An alternative estimate sug-
gests that the cost of capital could be lower. (See Appendix A.)
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How the Returns from Drug
Development Would Change
The Administration's proposal affects the returns
from drug development by changing the quantity of
drugs that a company can expect to sell and the rev-
enue it can expect to receive on each unit of a drug.
In analyzing the effect of the Administration's pro-
posal on future returns from research and develop-
ment, it is convenient to separate the pharmaceutical
market into two parts: that serving the under-65
population and that serving the 65-and-over popula-
tion. In the Administration's proposal, the alliance
system covers almost all of those under 65, and
Medicare covers almost all of those who are 65 and
over. (The exceptions are that Medicare covers 1
percent of the under-65 population, and a small pro-
portion of Medicare enrollees could choose to enroll
in a health plan through the alliance system.)
The Administration's proposal for universal
coverage would primarily affect the prescription
drug expenditures of those people who are under
65. The addition of a drug benefit to Medicare
would primarily affect those who are 65 and older.
Manufacturers would be required to pay at least a
17 percent rebate to the federal government on
outpatient Pharmaceuticals purchased by Medicare
enrollees. Since Medicare covers most of the 65-
and-over population, the rebate would reduce the
revenue received on drugs that are sold primarily to
this group. The universal coverage provision would
have its greatest effect on the demand for drugs by
extending coverage to the uninsured, 99 percent of
whom are under age 65. Most current Medicaid
beneficiaries would obtain coverage through re-
gional alliances, and the Medicaid drug rebates
would no longer exist.
The Congressional Budget Office calculated the
effect of these provisions on the returns from drug
development using the sample of 67 drugs examined
by Grabowski and Vernon. The drugs were intro-
duced in the United States between 1980 and 1984.
The sales data run through 1992; therefore, there
were only 8 to 12 years of actual sales data for
these drugs, depending on the year they were intro-
duced on the market. Grabowski and Vernon pro-
jected sales after 1992 for each drug through its
product life of 20 years.
The returns on a drug equal the present value of
the profits it generates during its product life.
When demand for Pharmaceuticals rises, the change
in profits is equal to the increase in sales less the
cost of producing more units of the drug. The
increase in returns on a drug equal the discounted
value of this rise in profits in each year of the
drug's product life.8
Almost all of the changes in the demand for
prescription drugs, as well as those in the Medicare
rebate, would apply only to outpatient prescription
drugs, which constitute approximately 77 percent of
all sales of prescription drugs in the United States.
Also, these changes would affect only U.S. sales,
which both Grabowski and OTA have assumed
constitute one-half of all worldwide sales of the
drugs in their samples. Evidence suggests that the
U.S sales of patented drugs constitute somewhat less
than one-half of worldwide sales (see Chapter 2).
The sales of U.S. outpatient prescription drugs
therefore constitute less than 40 percent of the total
worldwide sales of drugs patented in the United
States (77 percent of 50 percent).
CBO assumed that for the purpose of these
calculations the cost of producing an extra unit of a
drug is equal to 25 percent of the drug's price.
This estimate of incremental costs is based on the
OTA study, which found that production and distri-
bution costs were equal to 25 percent of sales. The
25 percent included the depreciation costs of the
manufacturing plant, which are not part of (variable)
unit costs. The cost of producing another unit of a
drug could therefore be below 25 percent of product
price. If demand is permanently increased, how-
ever, pharmaceutical companies would be likely to
increase their production capacity. Some adjustment
should therefore be made for this new capacity.
Using total plant depreciation clearly overstates the
8. The U.S. population is growing at a rate of about 1 percent a year.
Investment in new R&D projects today puts the average drug on
the market 12 years from now; however, the U.S. population will
be larger then. As the pharmaceutical market grows, the returns
from drug development will increase, all other factors being equal.
CBO did not take this effect into account in these calculations.
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cost of this incremental capacity. The overstatement
might be justified, however, by arguing that some
small adjustment can be made for producers' in-
creases in administrative or marketing costs when
responding to induced demand.
Other estimates of incremental (or marginal)
cost range between 17 percent and 34 percent of
product price (discussed further below). The results
presented in this chapter are not very sensitive to
variations of incremental cost within this range.
The Under-65 Population
The quantity of prescription drugs sold to the under-
65 market could increase by approximately 6 per-
cent if the Administration's proposal for universal
coverage were enacted. Because of the uncertainties
involved in the induced demand calculations, CBO
has considered a wider range of induced demand
estimates in the sensitivity analysis section below.
For the base case, it is assumed that demand
under the universal coverage provision of the Ad-
ministration's proposal would increase expenditures
for prescription drugs on the part of the under-65
population by 6 percent. The change in profits is
equal to a 6 percent increase in U.S. sales, minus
the cost of producing more units of the drug. An
examination of the discounted value of this increase
in profits over the product life of the drugs in the
sample (20 years) shows that when demand in-
creases by 6 percent, the profits from developing a
new drug for the under-65 population could increase
by an average of $19 million (see Appendix B).
This amount constitutes an 8 percent increase in the
average profits from developing a drug.
Absorbing Medicaid into the alliance system
would eliminate the rebates that pharmaceutical
manufacturers are required to pay to the government
on all drugs purchased through Medicaid. A repeal
of this rebate would raise the average revenue per
unit of the drug sold on the outpatient market by 2
percent because Medicaid covers 10 percent to 15
percent of all outpatient pharmaceutical expenditures
(see Chapter 5). A 2 percent increase in unit reve-
nue on outpatient drugs would yield an average
increase of $6 million in profits from drug develop-
ment (see Appendix B). Thus, the repeal of the
Medicaid rebate would further increase the present
value of profits generated from marketing a drug by
an average of $6 million.
Together, these two effects imply that the Ad-
ministration's proposal would raise the profits from
a drug developed exclusively for the under-65 popu-
lation by an average of $26 million (see Table 5).
This amount constitutes an 11 percent increase in
the average present value of profits (returns) gener-
ated from marketing a drug. The increase is sub-
stantial, considering that it has been estimated that
average returns exceed R&D costs by just $22 mil-
lion to $36 million.
The 65-and-Over Population
The proposal's new Medicare drug benefit could
increase the quantity of outpatient prescription drugs
sold to the 65-and-over population by approximately
4 percent (see Chapter 3). By itself, this change
would increase the profits from developing a new
drug for the 65-and-over population by an average
of $10 million. But the proposal would also require
that pharmaceutical manufacturers pay a 17 percent
rebate to the government on all outpatient drugs
purchased through Medicare. CBO estimates that a
rebate of 17 percent on all outpatient drugs paid for
by Medicare, together with the 4 percent increase in
outpatient demand, would reduce the returns on
drugs marketed to the 65-and-over population by an
average of $39 million (see Appendix B). This
would amount to a 17 percent decline in the average
returns from developing a drug, assuming that the
pharmaceutical manufacturers would not recover
any of the rebate by raising prices. If manufacturers
were able to offset some of this rebate by raising
prices, the decline in returns would be smaller.
Under the Administration's proposal, people
eligible for Medicare who are employed or married
to an employed worker would obtain their primary
coverage through an alliance rather than through
Medicare. CBO has estimated that in 1998, when
the Administration's proposal would become fully
operational nationwide, this change in coverage
would reduce the number of people who receive
primary coverage through Medicare by 2.5 mil-
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Table 5.
The Effect of the Administration's Proposal on Average Profits from Developing a Drug: Base Case
Change in Average Profits
from Developing a Drug8
(In millions of 1990 dollars)
Administration's
Proposal
Universal
Coverage
Description
Coverage would be
extended to the
37 million uninsured,
almost all of whom are
under 65. Coverage
would improve for
another 9 percent
of the under-65
population.
Effect on the
Prescription Drug
Market
(Base-Case
Assumptions)
Expenditures by
the under-65
population on all
Pharmaceuticals
would rise by 6.4
percent.
Drugs
Purchased
Only by
People
Under 65
19
Drugs
Purchased
Only by
People
65 and Over
0
Drugs Purchased
Two-Thirds by
People Under 65,
One-Third by
People 65 and Over
(Market average)6
13
Medicaid
Becomes Part
of the Alliance
System
Drug Benefit
Added to
Medicare
Government would
fully subsidize
participation of
most Medicaid
recipients in the
alliance system.
Medicare would
cover outpatient
drugs. A rebate
of at least 17 per-
cent would be im-
posed on outpatient
drugs purchased
through Medicare.
Medicaid rebates
would be eliminated.
Average unit revenues
on outpatient sales
would rise by 2
percent.
Expenditures by the
65-and-over population
on outpatient pharma-
ceuticals would rise
by 4.5 percent. Unit
revenues would decline
by 17 percent.
Total
J)
26
-39
-33
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
a. Equals the change in the present value of profits generated from worldwide sales of the average drug over its product life. The calcula-
tions involved in preparing this table are explained in Appendix B.
b. On average, 34 percent of prescription drug expenditures can be attributed to people 65 and over. This column equals 66 percent of
column 3 plus 34 percent of column 4.
lion.9 Since 0.7 million of these people would be
disabled, by 1998 the number of 65-and-over Medi-
care enrollees would fall by about 1.8 million-an
approximate 5 percent decline in the number of 65-
9. Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Administration's
Health Proposal (February 1994), p. 34.
and-over Medicare enrollees (below what it would
have been without this provision). This decline in
the proportion of the 65-and-over population that
would be covered through Medicare was accounted
for in the above calculation.
In 1987, Medicaid covered 9 percent to 10
percent of the outpatient prescription drug expen-
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ditures for both the under- and over-65 popula-
tions.10 Thus, the repeal of the Medicaid rebate
would affect the 65-and-over market much as it did
the under-65 market. The returns from drugs devel-
oped primarily for those who are 65 and over
should also increase by an average of $6 million.
After accounting for the increase in average price,
which would occur as the Medicaid rebates are
repealed, returns from a drug developed for the 65-
and-over population would fall by an average of
$33 million (see Table 5). This net amount is a
decline of 14 percent in the average returns from
developing a drug. The decline would nearly elimi-
nate excess returns as measured by OTA and would
exceed excess returns as measured by Grabowski.
A decline in the returns from developing drugs
for the 65-and-over population would reduce the
manufacturers' incentive to develop them and could
result in a decline in the level of research into drugs
used primarily by the 65-and-over population. If
that happened, research projects that were expected
to be the least profitable would be dropped first. If
the level of research into drugs aimed at the 65-and-
over population were reduced, the projects that were
undertaken would on average become more profit-
able. Most drugs that previously appeared profit-
able to develop for the 65-and-over population
might still seem profitable.
The Full Market-Over and Under 65
When averaged among all drugs, returns from R&D
would rise slightly under the Administration's pro-
posed changes. Returns from those drugs sold pri-
marily to people 65 and over would fall, and those
from drugs sold mostly to the under-65 population
would rise. But few drugs are marketed exclusively
to either population. The 65-and-over population
consumes approximately one-third of all prescription
drugs. When averaged among all drugs, the change
in returns from drug development is equal to one-
third of the change in returns calculated for the 65-
and-over market, plus two-thirds of the change in
returns calculated for the under-65 market. Thus,
returns from drug development, averaged among all
drugs, could rise by $6 million under the changes
proposed by the Administration (see Table 5). The
change is small-equal to less than 3 percent of total
estimated returns from drug development.
Although these changes in the over- and under-
65 markets nearly balance out when returns are
averaged among all drugs, they may affect the types
of research projects that are undertaken. The re-
turns from developing drugs primarily for those 65
and over would decline, whereas the returns from
developing a drug for the under-65 market would
rise. Although illnesses do not typically strike only
the 65-and-over population, the prevalance of cer-
tain health problems is disproportionately high
among this age group. People over 65 account for
an extremely large share of the market for drugs to
treat such disorders as prostate ailments, osteoporo-
sis, and Alzheimer's disease. In other instances,
they represent a large but not overwhelming share
of the potential market; for example, doctors report
that more than 55 percent of their prescriptions for
cardiovascular drugs are written for people over
65.n Their larger than one-half share alone appears
to be sufficient to change the Administration's pro-
posal from a modestly positive net influence on
returns to a negative one for these drugs (see Figure
9).
If two-thirds of a drug's potential market con-
sists of people 65 and over, average returns would
fall by $13 million. This decline would be elimi-
nated if the Medicare rebate were reduced from 17
percent to 10 percent. Under the Administration's
proposal, if half of the potential market for a drug
consists of people over 65, average returns would
drop by $4 million. This decrease is equal to less
than 2 percent of the average returns from develop-
ing a drug.
10. Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D, p. 240.
The rate of expansion of under-65 Medicaid enrollees may have
exceeded that of 65-and-over Medicaid enrollees since 1987.
11. Doctors' reports may differ from their actual prescriptions. The
percentage represents the weighted average among several catego-
ries of coronary drugs. IMS America, National Disease and Ther-
apeutic Index, U.S. Drug Store and U.S. Hospital Audits (Plym-
outh Meeting, Pa.: IMS America, Ltd., 1994).
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Figure 9.
How the Change in Average Returns from
Developing a Drug Under the Administration's
Proposal Varies as the Share Consumed by
People 65 and Over Increases
40
20
Millions of 1990 Dollars
-20
-40
Market Average
Change in
Average Returns
20 40 60 80
Percentage Consumed by 65-and-Over Population
100
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
NOTE: On average, people 65 and over consume 34 percent of
prescription drugs.
If research can be sufficiently targeted, this
difference in returns by age category could cause
some shift in research away from outpatient drugs
for the 65-and-over population toward drugs devel-
oped primarily for the under-65 population. The
shift may be small, however, and is not estimated.
Sensitivity of the Results to
the Base-Case Assumptions
Given the uncertainties surrounding the estimates of
induced demand and the effect of the Medicare
rebate agreement on the price of new drugs, CBO
changed the base-case assumptions to assess the
degree to which these results could vary. The base
case assumes that marginal cost would be equal to
25 percent of the unit price and that if the Admin-
istration's proposal were enacted:
Universal coverage would increase all prescrip-
tion drug expenditures of the under-65 popula-
tion by 6 percent, and the Medicare drug benefit
would increase all prescription drug expendi-
tures of the 65-and-over population by 4 per-
cent;
The resulting Medicare rebate would effectively
lower unit revenues (the per-unit manufacturer's
price less the rebate) by 17 percent on drugs
purchased by Medicare enrollees;
The repeal of the Medicaid rebate would in-
crease unit revenues on outpatient prescription
drugs by 2 percent; and,
There would be no further erosion of sales
caused by generic competition after patent expi-
ration.
Changes in Demand
Based on the sales data of Grabowski and Vernon's
sample of 67 drugs, every 1 percent increase in
demand for pharmaceuticals in the United States
would increase the net returns from the average
drug by approximately $3 million after taxes (see
Appendix B). The base-case estimates of induced
demand are somewhat conservative; even so, the
base case predicts a slight increase in returns from
R&D under the Administration's proposal. If the
assumptions were even more conservative, however,
and demand growth were 50 percent below that
assumed in the base case, the effect of the universal
coverage provision and the Medicare drug benefit
on average returns from drug development would
still be small, lowering average returns by just $2
million (see Table 6). If the induced demand esti-
mates were doubled, average returns would increase
by $21 million, an 8 percent increase in the total
returns from the average drug and a more than 50
percent increase in excess returns.
Incremental Costs
The base case assumes that the marginal or incre-
mental cost of producing one more unit is equal to
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Table 6.
The Effect of the Administration's Proposal on Average Profits from Developing
a Drug Under Varying Assumptions About Induced Demand (In millions of 1990 dollars)
Population Under 65:
The Effect of
Universal Coverage8
Base Case
Demand 50 Percent Higher
Demand 100 Percent Higher
Demand 50 Percent Lower
Assumed
Change in
Demand0
(Percent)
6
10
13
3
Effect on
Average
Profits
19
29
39
10
Population Over 65:
The Effect of
Changes to Medicare
Assumed
Change in
Demand0
(Percent)
3e
5
7
2
Effect on
Average
Profits
-39
-35
-31
-43
Market Average6
Assumed
Change in
Demand
(Percent)
5
8
11
3
Effect on
Average
Profitsd
6
13
21
-2
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
a. Universal coverage here refers to a universal entitlement to the standard benefit package proposed by the Administration. It includes a
prescription drug benefit.
b. Averaged over all drugs, based on 34 percent of prescription drugs sold to those 65 and over and 66 percent of prescription drugs sold
to those under 65.
c. The percentage increase in prescription drug expenditures (both inpatient and outpatient).
d. Equals 66 percent of column 2 plus 34 percent of column 4 plus $6 million (for repeal of the Medicaid rebates).
e. Outpatient drug expenditures are assumed to rise 4.5 percent in the base case for this group. Since outpatient drugs constitute 77
percent of prescription drug sales, total expenditures for this group would rise by 3.4 percent (77 percent of 4.5 percent).
25 percent of the product price. A lower estimate
of incremental costs comes from the work of econo-
mists Richard Caves, Michael Whinston, and Mark
Hurwitz, which shows that the price of generic
drugs, after sufficient generic entry, amounts to 17
percent of the price of the brand-name drug against
which they compete.12 This ratio can be considered
12. Richard Caves, Michael Whinston, and Mark Hurwitz, "Patent
Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical
Industry," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconom-
ics, 1991 (1991). The generic price is estimated to be 17 percent
of the brand-name price before patent expiration and generic entry.
In addition, Henry Grabowski and John Vernon estimated the
marginal cost of a patented drug to be 21 percent of product price.
See "Brand Loyalty, Entry and Price Competition in Pharmaceuti-
cals after the 1984 Act," Journal of Law and Economics (October
1992).
an estimate of marginal cost because the unit costs
of producing a generic drug should be similar to
those of producing a brand-name drug. By contrast,
the Census of Manufactures reports that material
and production-labor costs constituted 34 percent of
the value of drug shipments in 1987. But this ratio
probably overstates the share of incremental costs,
since the census includes over-the-counter drugs,
which are likely to have lower markups.13
The base-case results are not very sensitive to
the marginal cost assumption (see Table 7). The
13. Bureau of the Census, 7957 Census of Manufactures, Industry
Series, Drugs (April 1990), Table la-1.
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results do not change substantially for incremental
costs that range between 17 percent and 35 percent
of prescription drug prices. Even if the marginal
cost were equal to 40 percent of a drug's price, the
returns from the average drug would still rise
slightly under the Administration's proposal.
Changes in New Drug Prices
If pharmaceutical companies, by raising the prices
of new drugs, can offset some of the revenue they
would lose because of the rebate, the returns from
the development of a drug for the 65-and-over pop-
ulation would decline by less than $33 million.
This offset could occur if manufacturers increased
the launch prices of new drugs and the Secretary of
Health and Human Services did not increase the
Medicare rebate. It is not known, however, whether
launch prices would be higher or lower as a result
of the Medicare rebate agreement. The larger the
proportion of a drug's market that belongs to Medi-
care enrollees, the greater is the Secretary's power
to influence the drug's price. The base case as-
Table 7.
The Effect of the Administration's Proposal on Average Profits from Developing
a Drug Under Varying Assumptions About Marginal Cost (In millions of 1990 dollars)
Marginal Cost
as a Percentage
of Product Price
Population
Under 65:
The Effect of
Universal
Coverage on
Average Returns8
Population
Over 65:
The Effect of
Changes to
Medicare on
Average Returns
Market
Average
Change
in Profits5
Base Case 25 19 -39
Marginal Cost
8 Percentage
Points Lower 17 21 -38
Marginal Cost
5 Percentage
Points Lower 20 21 -38
Marginal Cost
5 Percentage
Points Higher 30 18 -40
Marginal Cost
10 Percentage
Points Higher 35 17 -41
Marginal Cost
15 Percentage
Points Higher 40 16 -41
7
7
4
3
2
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
a. Universal coverage here refers to a universal entitlement to the standard benefit package proposed by the Administration. It includes a
prescription drug benefit.
b. Averaged over all drugs, based on 34 percent of prescription drugs sold to those 65 and over and 66 percent of prescription drugs sold
to those under 65. Change equals 66 percent of column 2 plus 34 percent of column 3 plus $6 million (for repeal of the Medicaid
rebates).
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Table 8.
The Effect of the Administration's Proposal on Average Profits from Developing
a Drug for the 65-and-Over Population Under Variying Assumptions About Producer Price
Percentage Change
in Producer Price*
Precentage Change
in Unit Revenue
When Combined
with the Rebateb
Change in Average Returns0
(In miilions of 1990 dollars)
Assuming
Quantity Sold Assuming Quantity
Does Not Change Sold Changes*
Base Case
Price 5 Percent Higher
Price 10 Percent Higher
Price 5 Percent Lower
Price 1 0 Percent Lower
0
5
10
-5
•10
-17
-13
-9
-21
-25
-33
-15
4
-51
-70
-33
-18
-4
-48
-62
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
a. This percentage change in producer price is assumed to hold throughout the product life of the drug.
b. Equals column 1 minus 17 percentage points minus 17 percent of column 1.
c. Includes $6 million for the repeal of the Medicaid rebates. The calculations are explained in Appendix C.
d. Assumes that for every 1 percent increase (or decrease) in price the quantity sold falls (or rises) by 0.3 percent.
sumes that pharmaceutical companies are not able to
circumvent the rebates by raising prices. If negotia-
tions over the size of the rebate did not prevent
drug prices from rising, returns could fall by less
than 14 percent on drugs developed for the 65-and-
over population. If these negotiations were to result
in lower drug prices, returns could fall even farther.
The base case assumes that the Medicare rebate
agreement does not affect prescription drug prices.
In the base case, the changes proposed in Medicare
would lower the returns from drugs developed for
the 65-and-older population by $33 million. If, in
addition, the prices of these drugs were lowered by
an average of 10 percent throughout their product
lives (and the rebate remained at 17 percent), re-
turns could fall by up to $62 million on drugs sold
only to the 65-and-over population (see Table 8).14
14. For these calculations, CBO assumes that demand is relatively
unresponsive to price changes (specifically, for a 1 percent in-
crease in price the quantity purchased declines by just 0.3 per-
cent). See Appendix B for an explanation of the calculations.
This fall would represent a 27 percent decline in
average returns from drugs developed for the 65-
and-over population. Conversely, if a drug's price
were raised by 10 percent, and the rebate remained
at 17 percent, the returns on drugs developed for the
65-and-over population could fall by just $4 million.
The change in returns on drugs developed primarily
for the 65-and-over population depends critically on
the effect of the Medicare rebate agreement on the
prices of new drugs used intensively by Medicare
enrollees.
Competition from Generic Drugs
The present discounted value of U.S. sales used in
these calculations was obtained from Grabowski and
Vernon's sample of 67 new drugs introduced be-
tween 1980 and 1984. Since the sales data run only
through 1992, there were only 8 to 12 years of ac-
tual information about each drug. Most drugs in the
sample have effective patent lives of 9 to 13 years.
Grabowski and Vernon projected the U.S. sales of
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each drug through a 20-year product life. Based on
their previous work, the authors assumed that sales
declined by 30 percent in the first year after patent
expiration, 21 percent in the second, and 20 percent
during the final four years. In the remaining years
after patent expiration, they assumed sales would
erode at a rate of 10 percent to 12 percent.15
The Medicare drug benefit would provide incen-
tives for enrollees to choose generic substitutes
when available. The proposal might also encourage
a higher rate of substitution of generic drugs by the
under-65 population. In the U.S. sales data used in
the base case obtained from Grabowski and Vernon,
it is assumed that five years after patent expiration,
sales of the name-brand drug have eroded to just 38
percent of the value they had in the year before ex-
piration. Grabowski and Vernon have estimated
that if the generic erosion rate were increased by 50
percent, average net returns would decline by $19
million.16 An OTA-commissioned study of 35
drugs that lost patent protection between 1984 and
1987 found that three years after patent expiration,
sales were still at 83 percent of the level they had
attained before patent expiration. OTA found that
an erosion rate of more than 30 percent a year in
each year after patent expiration would be necessary
before returns would fall by $36 million, eliminat-
ing the excess returns from drug development.
Conclusions
If the changes proposed by the Administration were
to increase the returns from drug development, in-
15. Grabowski and Vernon, "Brand Loyalty, Entry and Price Competi-
tion in Pharmaceuticals after the 1984 Act."
16. Henry Grabowski and John Vernon, "Returns to R&D on New
Drug Introductions in the 1980s" (paper presented at the American
Enterprise Institute Conference on Competitive Strategies in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, Washington, D.C., October 27-28, 1993).
vestment in new drugs would most likely rise.
When averaged among all drugs, returns would
increase slightly under the Administration's pro-
posal. Returns from drugs developed mostly for the
65-and-over population, however, would decline,
and the returns from developing drugs primarily for
those under 65 would increase.
Previous studies have found that the returns
from developing a new drug exceed the cost of
development by an average of $22 million to $36
million. The Administration's proposal for universal
coverage (including a drug benefit), together with a
repeal of the Medicaid rebates, could increase the
returns from developing a drug for the under-65
population by $26 million. The returns from devel-
oping a drug for the 65-and-over population would
be affected by Medicare's new drug benefit, the
new 17 percent Medicare rebate, and the repeal of
the Medicaid rebate. CBO estimates that together
these provisions in the Administration's proposal
could reduce the returns from developing a drug for
the 65-and-over population by $33 million.
The general level of R&D in the pharmaceutical
industry may not change much as a result of these
provisions because the returns change little when
averaged among all drugs. However, the difference
in returns by age category could cause an increase
in research into drugs aimed primarily at the under-
65 market and a slight decline in research into drugs
aimed primarily at the 65-and-over market.
It is not known whether the launch price of a
new drug would be higher or lower as a result of
the Medicare rebate agreement. The more fre-
quently a drug is purchased by Medicare enrollees,
the greater is the Secretary's power to influence the
drug's price. If the Medicare rebate agreement
results in lower prices of new drugs used intensively
by the over-65 population, the returns from develop-
ing drugs primarily for this population could decline
further.

Chapter Seven
Conclusions
A review of the major provisions for pharma-ceutical coverage in the Administration'shealth care proposal indicates that, on aver-
age, the returns from drug company research and
development would be unlikely to change; increases
resulting from one provision would wash out the
decreases resulting from another. The incentive
system facing pharmaceutical companies would
probably shift, however. Individual parts of the
drug market would be affected in different ways and
in different directions, perhaps inducing pharmaceu-
tical companies to shift their resources. But all of
these results would depend crucially on how the
pharmaceutical companies responded to the Medi-
care rebate agreement.
Clearly, the major direct vehicle in the Adminis-
tration's proposal for containing pharmaceutical
prices and costs would be Medicare's rebate on
prescription drugs. Although other provisions also
attempt to control costs, their effects would be
indirect or diffuse. Because drugs are such a small
part of total health care spending, the limits on the
rate of growth of insurance premiums would be
unlikely to inhibit drug prices substantially, espe-
cially if providers increase their use of drugs to
substitute medicinal treatments for surgical proce-
dures. The effect of the Advisory Council on
Breakthrough Drugs might be limited to only a few
drugs each year. Moreover, aside from its potential
influence on Medicare rebate negotiations, it would
at best have the power to make recommendations
and sway public opinion. Public opinion has
brought some drug prices down, especially when it
has already been mobilized-as in the case of some
drugs used to treat human immunodeficiency virus
infection-but has failed in other cases.
In view of increasing competition within the
pharmaceutical market, drug prices could easily
decrease regardless of the Administration's proposal.
The forces already at work will serve to reduce, but
probably not eliminate, whatever excess profits exist
in the industry. Given the reduced potential for
profitable investment, R&D may (and perhaps
should) decrease. But if the practice of medicine is
going to change toward an emphasis on more cost-
effectiveness, the use of pharmaceuticals is likely to
rise independently of other factors in the pharma-
ceutical market or the Administration's proposal.
The reader should be reminded of the uncer-
tainty surrounding the work of the Congressional
Budget Office in this instance. The tools that econ-
omists use work best with marginal changes, but the
contemplated changes are not marginal. Con-
sequently, although CBO has tested its conclusions
to see if they are valid in several dimensions, sub-
stantial imprecision remains.
The tensions and trade-offs discussed here go
beyond the Administration's proposal. Any health
care reform proposal that provides a prescription
drug benefit and expands the market will provide
more incentives for pharmaceutical R&D. Proposals
to contain the costs of drugs will reduce these in-
centives. CBO's estimate suggests that the Ad-
ministration's proposal balances these two aspects
almost exactly, but other plans may not do so.
Incentives Provided by the
Medicare Rebate
Viewed in isolation, the Medicare rebate would
provide pharmaceutical companies with many incen-
tives to reduce their R&D on prescription drugs for
the 65-and-over segment of the market, insofar as
such specialized drugs can be identified. The pro-
posed rebate of at least 17 percent would reduce the
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returns on new drugs that are aimed largely at the
65-and-over market. For example, the returns from
some cardiovascular medicines could be lowered
slightly by the rebates because of the large number
of 65-and-over consumers. Furthermore, the returns
from drugs developed for the under-65 population
would increase. This difference in returns on the
basis of age group may cause some R&D to be
shifted away from drugs targeted at people who are
65 years old and older, toward those pharmaceutic-
als aimed at younger people.
Medicare would impose additional rebates if
price increases rose above changes in the consumer
price index. New drugs, breakthrough or not, could
face a special rebate if their introductory or launch
price was judged too high, further lowering the
profit incentive. All of these additional provisions
are designed to ensure that pharmaceutical produc-
ers would absorb most, if not all, of the rebate from
their profits.
The Medicare rebate would probably provide a
different set of incentives than the Medicaid rebate.
Whereas Medicaid beneficiaries are distributed
throughout the population-indeed, poverty is the
only common denominator—Medicare beneficiaries
are concentrated in older age groups. And they
dominate numerically the age groups in which they
are concentrated, making up 90 percent of the 65-
and-over population. Moreover, the portion of the
market affected by a Medicare rebate is twice the
size of that currently affected by the Medicaid re-
bate.
The Medicare program, however, would not
operate^ in a political or economic vacuum. Politi-
cally, it would be difficult for Medicare to deny
coverage for a drug that treats a major illness suc-
cessfully, regardless of the outcome of rebate nego-
tiations with the manufacturer. Furthermore, the
market for most drugs is not perfectly segregated by
age; therefore, the rebate would affect only a por-
tion of the sales of each drug. Manufacturers may
be able to recover part of their rebate costs from
other sales by raising their prices.
The well-known serendipity of the R&D process
is also likely to operate in this context. Companies
not looking for treatments for conditions that mainly
affect persons 65 and older could discover such
treatments while searching for others. This seren-
dipity is less likely now, given the costs and com-
plexity of drug development and clinical testing.
Quite often, however, drugs developed to treat one
illness become widely used for other purposes.
In the context of all of these mitigating factors,
the analyses in previous chapters should not be
interpreted as meaning that there would be few new
drugs developed for the 65-and-over market. There
are too many counteracting factors to support that
strong a conclusion. But the more successful health
authorities are in making pharmaceutical producers
absorb the cost of the rebate, the less incentive
producers would have to produce drugs for this
market. By contrast, the less successful health
authorities are in making the pharmaceutical com-
panies absorb the rebate, the more other drug con-
sumers would pay to support Medicare drug bene-
fits.
The Changing Pharmaceutical
Market
The Administration's proposal takes advantage of
favorable trends in the pharmaceutical market. The
increased pressure on drug producers noted in previ-
ous chapters fits with the Administration's general
theme of encouraging more competition among
health care providers. Specific provisions of the
Administration's proposal, such as encouraging
greater use of generic drugs by Medicare beneficia-
ries, also incorporate some of the techniques that are
being used by managed care providers to control
costs. Although they take occasional advantage of
the general trend in the pharmaceutical market to-
wards increased competition, some provisions that
reduce Medicare costs, such as special rebates on
new drugs, may serve to discourage the develop-
ment of rival drugs.
Appendixes

Appendix A
The Cost of Capital
T he cost of capital is a large component ofthe total cost of introducing a new drug. Ittakes an average of 12 years to develop a
drug and obtain Food and Drug Administration
approval. Grabowski and Vernon capitalized re-
search and development (R&D) investment at a real
interest rate of 10.5 percent.1 Since investment in
drug development in its early stages is more risky
than in its later stages, the Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) varied the discount rate over
time, beginning at 14 percent and declining linearly
to 10 percent as market introduction approaches.2
The resulting discounted value of R&D costs was
higher than if a constant discount rate of 10.5 per-
cent had been used. If $10 million (valued in 1990
dollars) is invested in a drug during the first year,
the cost of that investment, capitalized to the year of
market introduction, is $33 million (in 1990 dollars)
at a real interest rate of 10.5 percent. In both stud-
ies, the cost of capital alone accounts for about half
of the total cost of developing a new drug (capital-
izing costs to the year of market introduction).
OTA commissioned a study of the cost of capi-
tal for the pharmaceutical industry in 1990. The
study found that the cost of equity capital for 17 of
the largest pharmaceutical companies, adjusted for
inflation, was between 10 percent and 11 per-
cent.3 This real cost of capital appears to be high
because inflation has already been deducted. It is
based on previous returns to equity investors, which
depend on after-tax corporate profits. And it in-
cludes a risk premium associated with the nondi-
versifiable risk for equity investors in the pharma-
ceutical industry. Nondiversifiable risk includes
both the risk arising from swings in the entire econ-
omy and the risk that a firm cannot eliminate by
investing in many projects.
OTA's estimate of the cost of capital is based
on the capital asset pricing model. According to
this model, the cost of equity capital is the sum of a
risk premium (based on the stock market risk pre-
mium for investors in corporate equities estimated at
a nominal rate of 8.7 percent in 1990) plus a risk-
free rate (6.8 percent in 1990, according to the
study). The risk premium associated with the phar-
maceutical stocks is estimated to be 98 percent of
the stock market risk premium in 1990. After ad-
justing for inflation expectations in 1990, the real
cost of equity capital for this industry was estimated
at 10.4 percent. By contrast, if the risk premium
calculated by G. Bennett Stewart were used, the
cost of capital would be about 1 percent lower than
that projected in the study OTA commissioned.4
Henry Grabowski and John Vernon, "Returns to R&D on New
Drug Introductions in the 1980s" (paper presented at the American
Enterprise Institute Conference on Competitive Strategies in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, Washington, D.C., October 27-28, 1993).
Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs,
Risks and Rewards (February 1993).
4.
Ibid., p. 278. Stewart C. Myers and Lakshmi Shyma-Sunder did
the study.
G.B. Stewart, The Quest for Value (New York: Harper Collins
Publishers, Inc., 1991), and Office of Technology Assessment,
Pharmaceutical R&D, p. 281.

Appendix B
Calculating the Change in Average Returns
from Drug Development
T his appendix presents the method of calcu-lating the changes in average returns fromdrug development under the Administra-
tion's proposal. The results of the first three calcu-
lations are summarized in Table 5 in Chapter 6.
1. Universal coverage under the Administration's
proposal would increase the average profits on
drugs sold to the under-65 population by $19 mil-
lion (in 1990 dollars). The change in average re-
turns on drugs sold to the under-65 population is
equal to the increase in prescription drug sales
caused by the universal coverage provision, less the
cost of producing more units of the drugs.
The calculation:
$19 = [0.064 - (0.064)(0.25)]($621)(0.65)
where:
0.064 = the percentage increase in prescription
drug sales to the under-65 population under the
universal coverage provision,
0.25 = unit variable cost as a percentage of
product price,
$621 = the present discounted value of U.S.
sales at a real interest rate of 10.5 percent, in
millions of 1990 dollars, and
0.65 = (1 - the marginal tax rate of 35 percent).
2. Under the Administration's proposal, the Medic-
aid rebates would be repealed. The Medicaid rebate
is equal to 15.7 percent of the average manufacturer
price or the best discount given to institutional
purchasers, whichever is greater (see Chapter 5).
Given that the rebate covers 10 percent to 15 per-
cent of the entire outpatient prescription drug mar-
ket, outpatient unit revenues would increase by
about 2 percent if this rebate is repealed.
The calculation:
0.016 = (0.157)(0.10) or 0.023 = (0.157)(0.15)
Assuming that the repeal of the Medicaid rebate
would increase outpatient unit revenues by 2 per-
cent, it follows that the profits from developing a
drug would increase by $6 million on average.
The calculation:
$6 = (0.02)($621)(0.77)(0.65)
where:
0.02 = percentage increase in outpatient unit
revenues when the Medicaid rebate is repealed;
0.77 = the proportion of prescription drug sales
that are outpatient.
3. The Medicare rebate, combined with the pro-
posed drug benefit, would reduce the returns on
drugs sold to the 65-and-over population by $39
million. This change is equal to the increase in
demand caused by Medicare's new drug benefit less
the cost of producing the extra output, less the
rebate of 17 percent paid on all drugs sold to 65-
and-over Medicare enrollees.
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The calculation:
-$39 = [0.043-(0.17)(0.95)-(0.17)(0.043)(0.95)-
(0.25)(.043)]($621)(0.77)(0.65)(0.946H[0.0041-
(0.25)(0.0041)]($621)(0.77)(0.65)
where:
0.043 = estimated increase in outpatient pre-
scription drug expenditures of 65-and-over
Medicare enrollees due to the Medicare drug
benefit;
0.17 = 17 percent rebate paid on all outpatient
drugs purchased through Medicare;
0.95 = the percentage of the current Medicare
population that will pay the 17 percent rebate.
Under the Administration's proposal the Medi-
care population would decline by 5 percent
when those with working spouses receive health
coverage through their spouses rather than
through Medicare. This does not affect the
induced demand calculation since these people
still receive a drug benefit. However, the Medi-
care rebate will apply to a smaller portion of the
population that is 65 and over.
0.946 = the portion of the 65-and-over outpa-
tient market that would be covered by
Medicare's new drug benefit. According to the
Health Care Financing Administration, there
were 29.7 million enrollees in Medicare's Sup-
plementary Medical Insurance (SMI) program in
1990 over age 65. This number includes some
non-U.S. residents. There were 0.3 million non-
U.S. residents enrolled in SMI in 1990. Thus,
the total U.S. resident population of those who
are 65 years old or older who enrolled in SMI
in 1990 was about 29.4 million. Since there
were 31.08 million U.S. residents 65 or older in
1990, it follows that approximately 94.6 percent
of U.S. residents age 65 or older were enrolled
in SMI.1
Health Care Financing Administration, Medicare and Medicaid
Statistical Supplement (1992), pp. 14, 18-19, and Bureau of the
Census, Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1993, p. 21.
0.0041 = the increase in prescription drug ex-
penditures of the 65-and-over population, caused
by physician and drug coverage for the unin-
sured in this age group. It is assumed that the
drug coverage would be received through the
alliance system (thus, no rebate is paid on the
0.4 percent increase in expenditures). Actually,
the uninsured in this age group could be cov-
ered either by the alliance system or by Medi-
care. However, since this group is so small, the
assumption has little effect on the result.
The increase in outpatient prescription drug expen-
ditures of the 65-and-over population that lies be-
hind this calculation is 4.5 percent.
The calculation:
0.045 = (0.043)(0.946) + 0.0041
4. It is stated in Chapter 6 that for every 1 percent
increase in the quantity of prescription drugs sold,
the average profits from developing a drug would
rise by $3 million (after taxes).
The calculation:
$3 = [0.01 - 0.25(0.01)]($621)(0.65)
The change in returns is equal to a 1 percent in-
crease in sales less the cost of producing 1 percent
more units of the drug (less the taxes on this extra
revenue).
The average U.S. sales of a drug during its
product life used in CBO's calculations appear to be
similar to those used by the Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) in its study on total returns from
research and development in the pharmaceutical
industry. Based on OTA's calculations, a decline of
8.6 percent in the U.S. price of all prescription
drugs would reduce average returns by $36 million
(eliminating the excess returns from drug develop-
ment, assuming that the quantity sold does not
change). According to the U.S. sales data used in
the above calculations, a decline of 8.8 percent in
the U.S. price is required to reduce returns by $36
million. This difference of just 0.2 percent indicates
that the present value of U.S. sales used here is
close to that obtained by OTA.
Appendix C
Sensitivity of Profit Calculations to
Product Price Changes
T his appendix explains how the returns fromdrugs developed for the 65-and-over popula-tion change when product price varies. The
results are summarized in Table 8 in Chapter 6. It
is assumed that the price change occurs throughout
the drug's product life on both inpatient and outpa-
tient sales. The Medicare rebate is only paid on
outpatient drugs and is assumed to remain at 17
percent.
Equations (1) and (2) estimate the change in
average returns to drugs developed for the over-65
population under the Administration's proposal
when, as a result of the Medicare rebate agreement,
pharmaceutical firms change drug prices. Equation
(1) assumes that the quantity sold does not change
when price changes, but equation (2) allows for
some adjustment in the quantity sold for a given
change in price.
1. No change in the quantity purchased (Column 3
of Table 8).
Ap = the percentage change in product price
Change in returns =
-33 + Ap[(621)(0.65)(0.77)(1.045)]
-Ap[(0.17)(0.946)(0.95)(0.77)(621)(0.65)
•(1.043)] + Ap[(621)(0.65)(0.23)]
The first term is the change in returns in the
base case. The second term is the increase in reve-
nues that occurs when a higher price is charged on
the outpatient market. (See Appendix B for an
explanation of each number.) The third term is the
increase in the Medicare rebate when the price is
raised. The fourth term is the increase in revenues
when a higher price is charged on the inpatient
market. This calculation makes the extreme as-
sumption that the quantity purchased does not
change when price changes. Usually, when price
rises, the quantity purchased declines. It is not
always profitable to raise price because the increase
in profits from charging more for each unit may be
less than the decline in profits that occurs when
fewer units are sold as a result of the rise in price.
2. The calculations underlying Column 4 of Table
8 account for a quantity response to a price change.
It is assumed that a 1 percent increase in price will
cause the quantity sold to fall by 0.3 percent.
Change in returns =
-33 + Ap[(621)(0.65)(0.77)(1.045)]
-Ap[(0.17)(0.946)(0.95)(0.77)(621)(0.65)
•(1.043)] + Ap[(621)(0.65)(0.23)]
- Ap(0.3)[(l-0.25)(621)(0.65)]
•[1-(0.946)(0.95)(0.77)]
-Ap(0.3)[(l-0.25-0.17)(621)(0.65)(0.946)
•(0.95X0.77)]
The first four terms are the same as in Equation
(1). The fifth term subtracts the decline in profits
because fewer units are sold on the non-Medicare
market when price rises. The final term subtracts
the decline in profits because fewer units are sold
on the Medicare market.




CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE
Second and D Streets, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20515
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300
THIRD-CLASS MAIL
POSTAGE & FEES PAID
C.B.O.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
PERMIT No. G-70
